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THE CONSTITUTION  
GLIMPSED FROM TULE LAKE 
PATRICK O. GUDRIDGE* 
Old Man.                          But there are some 
That do not care what’s gone, what’s left: 
The souls in Purgatory that come back 
To habitations and familiar spots. 
Boy. Your wits are out again. 
Old Man.                              Re-live 
Their transgressions, and that not once 
But many times; they know at last 
The consequences of those transgressions 
Whether upon others or upon themselves; 
Upon others, others may bring help, 
For when the consequence is at an end 
The dream must end; if upon themselves, 
There is no help but in themselves 
And in mercy of God.1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The accumulated texts that supply the working materials of constitutional 
law are not only written records of responses to problems of government or-
ganization and claims concerning the rights of individuals.  They are also an ar-
chive, an accessible collective memory, means for readers (persons who choose 
to read later as well as writers in the process of writing) to re-experience con-
troversies and their conclusions, to consider and to accept, reject, or revise ex-
planations for conclusions, and to become, in the process, more or less partici-
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 1. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Purgatory, in SELECTED POEMS AND TWO PLAYS OF WILLIAM 
BUTLER YEATS 203 (M.L. Rosenthal ed., 1962). 
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pants (more or less complicit) in those controversies and conclusions.  If consti-
tutional law is therefore a version of purgatory and not hell, it may be because 
its readers and writers are able to imagine a terminus, an “end” to “[t]he conse-
quences” of “those transgressions” in which they are implicated.  Korematsu as 
Justice Black wrote it seems to have supposed a short stay indeed: whatever 
wrong this decision did would be undone in Ex Parte Endo only a few pages fur-
ther in the United States Reports.2 
If Justice Black was wrong, if neither he nor his readers are as yet purged of 
Korematsu’s “transgressions,” if Endo is not “absolution” (Jerry Kang’s 
freighted term),3 it may be because “the consequence” of Korematsu for the 
persons who were forcibly evacuated into concentration camps could not be de-
clared “at end” in 1944 and cannot even now.  Perhaps Endo did not—could 
not—accomplish what Black seemed to have hoped it would.  Perhaps “the con-
sequence” fell also upon Justice Black himself and now falls upon his readers.  
Reading Endo always requires remembering Korematsu, just as reading Kore-
matsu always sets the stage for reading Endo.  There is no “end” (it would have 
seemed to Yeats). 
Korematsu and Endo are not, however, the only pertinent texts.4  This Arti-
cle begins by sketching something of the content of The Spoilage, one of two 
principal publications issued after an ambitious contemporary study of what its 
organizers called “Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement,” under-
taken by University of California social scientists and funded by the Columbia, 
Giannini, and Rockefeller Foundations.5  The Spoilage is a complex and contro-
versial record of the efforts of camp residents, chiefly at Tule Lake, to identify 
and put to use effective forms of political action notwithstanding the resistance 
of camp administrators, sometimes dramatic and sometimes confoundingly pas-
sive.6  These political efforts conclude—in The Spoilage at least—with mass re-
nunciation of American citizenship by thousands of Tule Lake residents after 
 
 2. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).  For 
elaboration on this interpretation of Korematsu and Endo, see Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1939-47 (2003). 
 3. Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 958 
(2004) [hereinafter Denying Prejudice]. 
 4. There is also, importantly, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and there are also, 
as Eric Muller has reminded us, the draft resistance cases, see ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR 
THEIR COUNTRY (William M. O’Barr ed., 2001); Eric L. Muller, A Penny for their Thoughts: Draft Re-
sistance at the Poston Relocation Center, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (Spring 2005).  Within this es-
say, however artificially and (of course) ultimately wrongly, there is not much discussion of these other 
judicial efforts. 
 5. DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS & RICHARD S. NISHIMOTO, THE SPOILAGE: JAPANESE 
AMERICAN EVACUATION AND RESETTLEMENT DURING WORLD WAR II (1946) [hereinafter THE 
SPOILAGE].  For discussion of foundation support, see id. at xiv.  The second publication was 
DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS, THE SALVAGE (1952). 
 6. The University of California research effort—usually called the JERS study—is usefully de-
scribed, and some of its difficulties noted, in Yuji Ichioka, JERS Revisited, in VIEWS FROM WITHIN: 
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN EVACUATION AND RESETTLEMENT STUDY 3-23 (Yuji Ichioka ed., 1989) 
[hereinafter VIEWS FROM WITHIN].  For further discussion of critics, see infra Appendix pp. 108-18. 
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Endo issued and after announcement of the closing of the camps.7  The legal af-
tereffects of this renunciation and The Spoilage account of it soon became sub-
jects of decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in 
Acheson v. Murakami8 and its implementing successor McGrath v. Abo.9  In 
many ways remarkable if today largely forgotten, Murakami and Abo substan-
tially blocked official enforcement of the Tule Lake renunciations.  These deci-
sions and their constitutional context are explored at some length in this Arti-
cle—like Endo, along with Korematsu, confronting and testing readers and 
writers caught in constitutional purgatory. 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
Chief Judge Denman’s opinions in Murakami and Abo, it will become clear, 
may be grouped with Justice Douglas’s effort in Endo and Judge Goodman’s 
decision in Kuwabara10 blocking draft resistance prosecutions of Japanese 
American internees.  In their several ways, however cautious or seemingly idio-
syncratic their arguments, these cases all reach results that Korematsu would 
not have signaled.  Korematsu still looms large, of course, and hardly stands 
alone.  There is also Hirabayashi—the Supreme Court’s initial approval of the 
curfew enforced against Japanese Americans in the months after Pearl Harbor.  
There are still other decisions of the period—in the district courts and courts of 
appeals—that reach results similar to those in Korematsu and Hirabayashi.  
Even so, Murakami and Abo, along with Endo and Kuwabara, surely constitute 
too much work to ignore, too many decisions to be classed simply as outliers. 
The question of what to make of these latter cases is not easy.  In consider-
ing why this is so, it may be helpful to begin dialectically, by considering the 
eloquent recent work of Jerry Kang, deploying a jurisprudence within which 
Endo—and quite probably also Kuwabara, Murakami, and Abo—indeed figure 
at most as ironic counterpoints.11  Professor Kang writes to judge—to enforce 
“corporate responsibility”—to demand that the Supreme Court hold itself ac-
countable as an institution for Korematsu and its companion cases.12  He means 
to seek out, identify, and explode efforts at evasion.  Obviously, he undertakes 
this effort not to re-fight sixty-year-old controversies, but to introduce (or to re-
inforce) what he takes to be an important note within contemporary twenty-
first century politics.  He means to mark Korematsu (especially) as wrong in or-
 
 7. S. Frank Miyamoto, a junior contributor to the The Spoilage, noted in 1989 that “80 percent of 
the Kibei [Japanese American citizens who had received some education in Japan] and 60 percent of 
the Nisei [American-born persons of Japanese ancestry], 17.5 years of age and over at Tule Lake (over 
5,000 citizens) renounced their citizenship. . . .  Even granting the injustices of the evacuation, why 
should thousands of youths have taken so drastic a step?” S. Frank Miyamoto, Dorothy Swaine Thomas 
as Director of JERS: Some Personal Observations, in VIEWS FROM WITHIN, supra note 6, at 48. 
 8. 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949). 
 9. 186 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1951). 
 10. United States v. Kuwabara, 56 F. Supp 716 (N.D. Cal 1944). 
 11. Jerry Kang, Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment’s Shadow, 68 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 259 (Spring 2005). 
 12. Id. at 277; Kang, Denying Prejudice, supra note 3, at 966-70. 
07_GUDRIDGE.DOC 11/22/2005  11:34 AM 
84 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:81 
der to mark as wrong (or at least highly questionable) government actions to-
day—including (especially) court decisions—that in any way resemble Kore-
matsu and Japanese American internment.  More precisely, he means to associ-
ate Korematsu with official racism—including judicial complicity in (or 
tolerance of) that racism.  Korematsu becomes a “moral parable.”13  In order to 
do what he means to do, Kang needs to read Korematsu as clear-cut:  there can 
be no doubt that Justice Black was evasive and complicit.  He also needs to 
show that Endo is of a piece even though it reaches an opposite result.  It, too, 
must appear evasive—to this end, Professor Kang depicts Justice Douglas’s 
opinion as itself an exercise in avoidance, to be therefore Korematsu’s adjunct.14 
This is a too summary summary, of course.  Still, something at least of the 
force of Kang’s argument should be evident:  Why not encourage judges to ac-
knowledge institutional sin, the risk of recurring wrong-doing, and thus the 
need to put Korematsu and its companions off limits?  Kang recognizes that 
something like this has occurred regarding Korematsu itself, but he fears that 
the quarantine is too narrowly drawn—that Endo (and presumably other like 
cases) read in too celebratory a way will put judges off their guard.  There is, 
however, another twenty-first century politics.  The adversary is now the notion 
that in war law is silent.  “Korematsu is wrong,” some might say, “but what can 
you do?  If we proceed similarly today, it’s just proof that war is hell.”  On this 
view, Korematsu is recalled in order to reiterate Justice Jackson’s famous (and 
famously equivocal) dissent.  If Jackson was wrong, if we want Jackson to be 
wrong, Endo, Kuwabara, Murakami, and Abo (among other cases) become 
more central.  They show at least some judges working hard to identify some-
times obscure resources in American constitutional law available for purposes 
of criticizing officials and vindicating individuals.  Acknowledging their efforts 
reveals that constitutional law is not a collection of settled rules, but rather a 
collection of conflicting perspectives—a setting for dissent as well as acquies-
cence. 
The internment cases, within this approach, fit with other examples of war-
time constitutional innovation, with decisions like Learned Hand’s in Masses 
Publishing Co. v. Patten15 and the several Warren Court Cold War free speech 
improvisations16—and also, it may yet appear, Hamdi and Padilla.17  To be sure, 
there is within this approach a certain methodological naïveté, a willful refusal 
to recognize that, at any particular moment, much in constitutional law is 
 
 13. Kang, Watching the Watchers, supra note 11, at 259.  This project, of course, is not uniquely 
Professor Kang’s.  See, e.g., Roger Daniels, The Japanese American Cases, 1942-2004: A Social History, 
68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (Spring 2005) (drawing on Professor Daniels’s larger body of work). 
 14. See Kang, Denying Prejudice, supra note 3, at 960-61.  See also Kang, Watching the Watchers, 
supra note 11, at 19-20 n.104. 
 15. 244 Fed. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
 16. See Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L. 
J. 1801, 1850-65 (2004). 
 17. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) 2646-50; Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 722-24 
(2d Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).  For Professor Kang’s readings, see 
Watching the Watchers, supra note 11, at 10-18, 22. 
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treated either as though it were well-settled or as though it were simply a set of 
easily manipulated categories.  This is not, however, Pangloss redux—there is 
no inconsistency in also acknowledging that positive elements, as a matter of 
fact, were and are often swamped.  Rather, this alternative approach, insisting 
on contingency, means to be a demonstration of resources, a call to the individ-
ual responsibility of judges and advocates, and a suggestion that the moral poli-
tics of adjudication works with exemplars as well as with horrors. 
II 
THE SPOILAGE NARRATIVE 
Much like newspaper headlines, the chapter titles of The Spoilage suggest a 
kind of summary narrative.  The book begins with the “evacuation” or 
“[e]xpulsion”18 of West Coast residents austerely described in the first sentence 
of the first chapter as “having common ancestry with the enemy that launched 
the Pearl Harbor attack”;19 the “detention” or “[c]onfinement” of these per-
sons;20 and the process of “registration” or “[a]dministrative [d]etermination of 
“[l]oyalty” and “[d]isloyalty” to which they were subject.21  Thereafter attention 
narrows, addressing “segregation” of the “‘[d]isloyal’” at Tule Lake,22 and a se-
quence of events occurring at that camp, including “[s]trikes, [t]hreats, and 
[v]iolence”;23 “[m]artial [l]aw”;24 a “[p]eriod of [a]pathy”;25 “[s]uspicion, 
[b]eatings, and [m]urder”;26 “[p]ressure [t]actics”;27 and ultimately “[m]ass 
[r]elinquishment of American [c]itizenship.”28 
The Spoilage closely engages the events that it describes, often proceeding in 
painstaking detail, its account largely eschewing any effort to characterize its 
own theoretical framework, limiting overt authorial intervention (apart from 
the preface) to occasional transitional recapitulations.  The result is something 
very much like a nonfiction novel, enlisting the reader as collaborator, commit-
ting the reader to the work of interpreting and judging depicted events as they 
unfold.  However successful this approach may be as a matter of the politics of 
reading (quite successful in fact), it leaves The Spoilage very much dependent 
on the agendas and energies of its readers (more conspicuously, at least, than is 
usually the case) insofar as either abstracted or pointed uses of the work are 
concerned.  Thus, the propositions that follow, characterizing what appear to be 
 
 18. THE SPOILAGE, supra note 5, at xvii; see id. at 1-23. 
 19. Id. at 1. 
 20. Id. at xvii; see id. at 24-52. 
 21. Id. at xvii; see id. at 53-83. 
 22. Id. at xvii; see id. at 84-112. 
 23. Id. at xvii; see id. at 113-46. 
 24. Id. at xvii; see id. at 147-83. 
 25. Id. at xvii; see id. at 236-60. 
 26. Id. at xvii; see id. at 261-82. 
 27. Id. at xviii; see id. at 303-32. 
 28. Id. at xviii; see id. at 333-61. 
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principal emphases within The Spoilage narrative, should not be understood as 
straightforward exercises in condensation. 
First, The Spoilage is chiefly concerned with events occurring at Tule Lake 
or other camps as perceived from the point of view of occupants of the camps. 
Camp administrators figure prominently, but almost always distantly.  By and 
large, their actions are described, but their thinking or their aims, although not 
ignored entirely, receive limited attention.  The effects on camp occupants of 
administrative acts or failures to act matter most.29 
Second, camp occupants are largely preoccupied with the demands of ordi-
nary life inside the camps.  The Spoilage depicts evacuation and resettlement as 
immediately catastrophic.30  Evacuees must confront the brute facts of loss of 
home, loss of livelihood, loss of most personal property; pressing needs, and at-
tendant concerns, thus, become organization of living space, maintenance of 
family integrity, solutions to food requirements, and (absent accessible savings) 
arrangements for remunerative work.  For camp occupants, ordinary life-needs 
drive politics.  At points, The Spoilage distinguishes, in then customary ways, 
between first and second generation Japanese Americans (Issei and Nisei), and 
(within the second group) between individuals who had traveled and studied in 
Japan (Kibei) and those who had not.31  But as the narrative proceeds, although 
the impact of these differentiations does not appear as negligible, distinctive as-
pects of camp life as such, if often unevenly or inconsistently manifested, are the 
mainsprings of camp politics. 
Third, camp administrators are often uninformed or uninformative, slow to 
respond to occupant concerns, and heavy-handed or otherwise maladroit in 
dealing with unrest.32  In particular, the War Relocation Authority effort to as-
sess the loyalty of camp occupants figures in The Spoilage as an exemplary, re-
markably disruptive fiasco.33  Officials in some camps fail to explain what is at 
stake.  Occupants judge the loyalty questions from the perspective of what will 
happen to them next.  The association of the inquiry with the prospect of mili-
tary conscription marks “yes/yes” answers as difficult or even dangerous.34  In 
some camps, significant numbers of individuals refuse to complete question-
 
 29. For the assumptions explaining this focus (and criticism), see infra Appendix pp. ___. 
 30. THE SPOILAGE, supra note 5, at 14-23. 
 31. Id. at 3. 
 32. See id. at 40-52 (discussing developments at Tule Lake, Poston, and Manzanar). 
 33. Id. at 53-84. 
 34. Two items in a larger questionnaire that camp occupants were required to complete were cru-
cial to loyalty assessments: 
Question 27: Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat 
duty, wherever ordered? 
Question 28: Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faith-
fully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and for-
swear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign gov-
ernment, power, or organization? 
Id. at 57.  For the slightly different versions of these questions put to individuals not potentially subject 
to military service obligations, see id. at 58. 
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naires; a surprisingly large number of individuals (the percentage varying con-
siderably from camp to camp) fail to avow loyalty to the United States within 
the terms put forward.35  It is difficult, The Spoilage concludes, to read the re-
sults as anything other than an artifact of the administrative process.36  “[T]he 
strong contrasts among relocation projects reflected, in large measure, adminis-
trative variations in the handling of the program and conflicting evacuee-
administrative definitions of the issues involved.”37 
Fourth, the subsequent segregation of “disloyal” individuals at Tule Lake 
once more disrupts and puts in question elements of ordinary life.  Attempts to 
organize representative political institutions positioned to deal effectively with 
camp officials founder—at least partly because the “disloyal” cohort is, in fact, a 
rather heterogeneous group.38  Camp political processes fail to influence official 
action in any regular or predictable way, or even to elicit meaningful official 
communications.  Resort to forms of oppositional politics—work stoppages, 
demonstrations, and the like—leads to military intervention and assertion of au-
thority, incarceration of political representatives, and renewed, largely ineffec-
tual efforts by camp occupants to deal with officials (now military officers).39  
Another round of attempts at organizing representative processes for dealing 
with officials, mostly after control of Tule Lake reverts to the WRA, also col-
lapses because of the continued imprisonment of the first group of representa-
tives, because the second group is unable to make much visible progress in end-
ing this imprisonment (except one individual at a time), and because officials 
remain largely unresponsive to work-related demands.40  Active public support 
 
 35. Id. at 61. 
 36. Analysis of the data, and description of administrative processes at various camps, proceed at 
considerable length.  See id. at 61-83. 
 37. Id. at 82.  Professor Miyamoto emphasizes that the statistical analysis in The Spoilage also 
shows that “those who chose segregation at Tule Lake [responded “incorrectly” to the “loyalty” ques-
tions] were those who had experienced the greatest amount of discrimination and segregation before 
the war.”  Miyamoto, supra note 7, at 45; see id. at 43-46. 
 38. See id. at 88-89. 
Under the segregation program, the “disloyal,” as defined at registration [the survey process], 
had to decide whether they would stand by their declaration or retract. . . . [D]ecisions were 
often made for reasons highly irrelevant to the matter of political allegiance.  The most seem-
ingly irrelevant of these reasons, and the one having the greatest influence on the evacuees 
was their belief that a declaration of “loyalty” would imply eventual forced resettlement.  
Residents of the segregation center . . . could not resettle for the duration of the war whereas 
residents of relocation projects were being given leave clearance and subjected to intensive 
WRA pressure to resettle.  Many evacuees therefore believed that WRA was planning to 
force them out of camps to face the hostile American public responsible for their evacuation 
and detention.  To these people, the choice offered was not between Japan and America, in a 
political sense, but between Tule Lake and the rest of America, in a security sense. 
Id. at 88. 
 39. The Spoilage account of this sequence is notably detailed and complex.  See id. at 113-83. 
 40. See id. at 184-220. 
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for official political action, aimed at working with (and against) administrators, 
largely dissipates.41 
Fifth, with the failure of this second round, politics changes:  more efforts 
now focus on community organization as such, increasingly emphasizing “Japa-
nese” identity.  This new politics reinforces a chronic fear of informers (not un-
grounded) and a corresponding insistence upon shows of “loyalty” defined in 
identity terms.  Politics becomes increasingly personal individuals suspected of 
disloyalty (inu) are physically threatened, assaulted, or (in at least one instance) 
killed.42 
The administration was weakened with the thorough discrediting of many of the 
evacuees upon whom it had depended as a channel of communication and a means of 
collaboration.  Failure to apprehend assailants and assassins weakened the official 
forces devoted to the maintenance of law and order.  The more radical elements 
emerged from the underground and sponsored openly, and with impunity, programs 
that a short time before would have led to arrest and incarceration.43 
The Spoilage depicts both the origins of this “radical element” and the forms of 
their political action—including efforts to inculcate and celebrate Japanese cul-
ture—in terms that call attention to aims and dynamics interior to camp politics 
as such.44 
Sixth, announcement that the camps will close provokes another crisis at 
Tule Lake.  Camp occupants have access to relatively few sources of informa-
tion, often obviously skewed or simplified, especially regarding the progress of 
 
 41. As noted in The Spoilage,  
[E]fforts . . . preparing the groundwork for an election were met with a general indifference by 
the residents.  Even persons who felt that the election of a representative body might do much 
to bring order into the camp were pessimistic, for they believed that responsible persons, real-
izing the difficulty of getting caught between the administration and the people, and the possi-
bility of incurring criticisms for dissatisfactions for which they could not be responsible would, 
if elected, refuse to accept positions on the central body. 
Id. at 215. 
 42. Id. at 261-82, 271 (describing the murder of Takeo Noma). 
 43. Id. at 282. 
 44. These are representative passages—the first showing the “radical element” taking over ordi-
nary processes of camp political organization; the second interpreting ideological or cultural claims 
within the terms of ordinary camp life stresses: 
By the beginning of July the underground group had become a powerful and systematically in-
tegrated organization.  Representatives had been appointed in every block and had been co-
ordinated under ward representatives, who in turn formed a central committee. 
. . . 
The new transferees [to Tule Lake], both the undetermined and the determined “disloyals,” 
found themselves at an immediate disadvantage with respect to the old Tuleans, who had the 
best housing and the best jobs, were in positions of power and prestige and were favored by 
the administration.  The resulting jealousies and dissatisfactions provided fertile ground for 
the growth of the belief, fostered by the more determined “disloyals,” that the essential diffi-
culty was that Tule Lake was not composed entirely of “like-minded” people or “true disloy-
als” who had cast themselves off from America and were devoted to the pursuit of the Japa-
nese way of life.  Soon, even the least determined “disloyals” among the transferees were 
blaming the lack of determined “disloyalty” among the old Tuleans for the frictions in camp. 
Id. at 307, 304. 
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the war and the state of public opinion outside the camps.45  Occupants conclude 
that they will be once more left to fend for themselves, to relive (in other 
words) the experience of the original catastrophic dislocation, and left also to 
face the dangerous, prejudiced hostility of persons living outside the camps.46  
Renunciation of citizenship is understood as an expression of opposition and 
also as a way of forcing administrators to maintain camp residence for their 
families—and thus as a means of assuring an important measure of personal 
safety and economic support.47  The political environment of the camp—the as-
cendant insistence on “Japanese” identity—adds its own pressure.48  Large 
numbers of Tule Lake occupants renounce American citizenship.49 
With mass renunciation of citizenship by Nisei and Kibei, the cycle which began with 
evacuation was complete.  Their parents had lost their hard-won foothold in the eco-
nomic structure of America.  They, themselves, had been deprived of rights which in-
doctrination in American schools had led them to believe inviolable.  Charged with no 
offense, but victims of a military misconception, they had suffered confinement behind 
barbed wire.  They had been stigmatized as disloyal on grounds often far removed 
from any criterion of political allegiance.  They had been at the mercy of administra-
tive agencies working at cross-purposes.  They had yielded to parental compulsion in 
order to hold the family intact.  They had been intimidated by the ruthless tactics of 
pressure groups in camp.  They had become terrified by reports of the continuing hos-
tility of the American public, and they had finally renounced their irreparably depre-
ciated American citizenship.50 
III 
AFTERWORDS 
The Spoilage concludes leaving thousands of former occupants of Tule 
Lake, having renounced American citizenship, still living in the United States, 
their futures and their legal status uncertain.51  In 1948, three of these individu-
als applied for United States passports, were refused, and brought suit in fed-
eral district court in California, successfully obtaining a court order canceling 
their previous acts of renunciation.52  Judge William Mathes concluded: “[T]he 
purported renunciation of the plaintiffs . . . was not as a result of their free and 
intelligent choice but rather because of mental fear, intimidation, and coercions 
depriving them of . . . their will.”53  Mathes characterized conditions at Tule 
Lake in these terms: 
 
 45. See id. at 345-47. 
 46. Id. at 346-47. 
 47. See id. at 347-52. 
 48. See id. at 353-55. 
 49. See id. at 357-61. 
 50. Id. at 361. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Acheson v. Murakami, 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949). 
 53. Id. at 965-66.  The findings of fact and conclusions of Judge Mathes are published as Exhibit 1 
included with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirming the 
district court order.  See id. at 960. 
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The residents . . . had for almost four years been subject to the demoralizing effects of 
center life;  They had suffered physical hardship and loss of property from the evacua-
tion.  They had been stigmatized by the press as rioters.  Those who desired work were 
not given employment.  They had been subject to misinterpretation of the renuncia-
tion procedure.  They had been subject to rumors which had produced an irrational 
state of mind, which accompanied long detention, isolation, tension, and insecurity in 
the form of mass hysteria.54 
His main justification for canceling the renunciation declarations, however, was 
“[l]awlessness, gangsterism, and hoodlumism” within the Japanese American 
population at Tule Lake.55 
The United States introduced The Spoilage into evidence56—not surpris-
ingly, given the book’s depiction of renunciation (in many cases, anyway) as a 
product of “thinking” precisely illustrative of “perspective,” “balance,” and 
“free will.”57  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel repeatedly cited The Spoilage58 
and plainly understood its account of camp politics, but it also affirmed the dis-
trict court, elaborating an overlaying defense of the district court findings 
framed from a dramatically different perspective.  Chief Judge Denman,59 
joined by Judge Orr,60 insisted it was the United States, not “the Japanese com-
munity” depicted by Judge Mathes, that was ultimately responsible for “all the 
particular factors . . . found as leading to a condition of mind and spirit of the 
American citizens imprisoned at Tule Lake Center. . . .”61 
The principal headings subdividing the opinion not only summarize but sug-
gest something of the tone of Denman’s opinion: 
A.  The racial deportation.  Its unnecessary hardships and cruelty as affecting the atti-
tude of scores of thousands of loyal Americans towards their citizenship in a country 
so ordering them into imprisonment.62 
 
 54. Id. at 965. 
 55. Id.  The specific finding concerning one plaintiff—Miye Mae Murakami—is illustrative: 
She lived in an atmosphere of fears, threats, and scares stirred up by gangsters and hoodlums 
of the pro-Japanese organizations.  She was threatened with her life unless she renounced, 
even in the supposed privacy of the women’s washroom when rough-looking men invaded 
such room to put the women in fear of physical harm.  She lived in an atmosphere of assaults, 
batteries, stabbings, and pressures from neighbors; [s]he had heard of the mysterious murder 
of a leader of the Japanese community and that other residents would meet the same fate 
unless they renounced their citizenship.  These threats and fears resulted in her losing com-
pletely any sense of perspective or balance in her thinking.  She renounced her citizenship not 
of her own free will but by the pressure exerted upon her by the life in the community and by 
the fears that prevailed in the center. 
Id. 
 56. AUDRIE GIRDNER & ANNE LOFTIS, THE GREAT BETRAYAL: THE EVACUATION OF THE 
JAPANESE-AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR II 453 (1969). 
 57. See Abo, 176 F.2d at 965 (capacities that Judge Mathes found to be denied Miye Mae Mura-
kami by persistent pressure and threats). 
 58. See Murakami, 176 F.2d at 957 n.2, 958 n.5, 959 nn.6-10. 
 59. For one view of Denman, a complex figure (to say the least), see PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT 
WAR 175-76, 183-85, 265-68 (University of California Press 1993) (1983). 
 60. The third judge (Judge Stephens) did not participate.  See Murakami, 176 F.2d at 960. 
 61. Id. at 954. 
 62. Id. 
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B.  The incarceration at the Tule Lake stockade.  Its effect upon the minds of our fel-
low citizens as to the value of their citizenship.63 
C.  General De Witt’s doctrine of enemy racism inherited by blood strain.  Its para-
mount effect on the minds of the imprisoned citizens.64 
Passage after passage of the opinion amplified the main themes: 
One has no difficulty imagining the thousands of families in which the mother must 
carry the babies, measuring the carrying capacity of each of the other children able to 
walk against the sacrifice of one or another household utensil, or book, or family 
treasure.  The emotion of free citizens contemplating the pathetic testing of the carry-
ing capacity of stumbling infants lifting their bundles is not pertinent here.  What is 
pertinent is what our incarcerated fellow citizens felt about it in their several years be-
hind barbed wire under the machine guns of the soldiers in their prison’s turrets.  For, 
so far as concerns the psychology of the renunciations to those renouncing and their 
surrounding companions, the beguiling words “evacuation” meant deportation, 
“evacuees” meant prison and their single rooms, some crowding in six persons, meant 
cells, as they in fact were.  Their true character is recognized in this opinion.65 
As if to drive it in to their already shocked spirits that their treatment was to be like 
criminals in a penitentiary, they were paid the prison wage of $12 a month to the un-
skilled and $16 to those skilled, while their free fellow citizens, working beside them, 
were paid the prevailing $12 to $20 per day. . . . The buildings were covered with 
tarred paper over green and shrinking shiplap—this for the low winter temperatures 
of the high elevation of Tule Lake. . . .  No federal penitentiary so treats its adult pris-
oners.  Here were the children and babies as well.66 
The identity of [De Witt’s] doctrine with that of the Hitler generals towards those hav-
ing blood strains of a western Asiatic race as justifying the gas chambers of Dachau 
must have been realized by the educated Tule Lake prisoners of Japanese blood 
strain.  The German mob’s cry of “der Jude” and “the Jap is a Jap” to be “wiped off 
the map” have a not remote relationship in the minds of scores of thousands of Ni-
sei, . . . though the map referred to may have been the area of exclusion.67 
The particular camp incidents stressed by Judge Mathes in the district court 
opinion needed to be set within the context constructed by the United States 
government itself, as well as the circumstances outside Tule Lake as internees 
perceived them.  Denman reproduced a series of statements (all taken from The 
Spoilage) of Japanese American renouncers.68  These are representative: 
“I did not expect this of the Army. . . .  But [to] a General De Witt, we were all alike.  
‘A Jap is a Jap.  Once a Jap, always a Jap.’  
* * *   
I swore to become a Jap 100 percent, and never do another day’s work to help this 
country fight this war.  My decision to renounce my citizenship there and then was ab-
solute.”69 
 
 63. Id. at 955. 
 64. Id. at 957. 
 65. Id. at 955. 
 66. Id. at 956. 
 67. Id. at 958. 
 68. See id. at 958-59. 
 69. Id. at 958. 
07_GUDRIDGE.DOC 11/22/2005  11:34 AM 
92 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:81 
“What do they want us to do?  Go back to California and get filled full of lead?  I’m 
going to sit here and watch.”70 
It is easy to wonder, reading the Ninth Circuit opinion, why the added ar-
gument was thought to be necessary.  Murakami, after all, considered the claims 
and circumstances of only three individuals.  Chief Judge Denman did not di-
rectly criticize the analysis that Judge Mathes had put forward.71  But a second 
suit was already underway, and would reach the appellate court relatively 
quickly:  McGrath v. Abo,72 at the time involving some 4315 plaintiffs (more 
would join later), almost all occupants of Tule Lake, who were being held for 
deportation under the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, and who sought a judicial dec-
laration setting aside their renunciations.  The district court judge—Judge Louis 
Goodman73—had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.74  The Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court and remanded the case, but on terms that ultimately re-
sulted, although not always quickly, in the cancellation of the citizenship renun-
ciations of over ninety percent of the plaintiffs.75  In Abo, the Ninth Circuit 
panel approach to Murakami mattered much. 
Chief Judge Denman again wrote for the panel, the same judges who had 
heard Murakami (with all three joining in the opinion this time).  The problem 
Abo posed was, in the first instance, procedural.  Initially, counsel for plaintiffs 
brought suit on behalf of just under one thousand named plaintiffs, and added 
the names of several thousands more as litigation proceeded in the district 
court.76  The Ninth Circuit ruled that the case was properly regarded as a class 
action—within the language of Rule 23 as it then stood, there was “a common 
question of law or fact . . . and a common relief is sought.”77  In retrospect, as 
Jack Greenberg observed, this conclusion may seem to have been “a neat and 
probably foreordained outcome.”78  But Judge Denman was obviously aware 
that, as the jargon of the day put it, the class action was at bottom “spurious,” 
concerned conceptually with the enforcement of “several” rights, and not one 
true class right.79  “[T]he massing in one suit of thousands of cases of individual 
 
 70. Id. at 959. 
 71. See id. at 954. 
 72. 186 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1951). 
 73. On Judge Goodman’s now well-known efforts to bring constitutional norms to bear in the con-
text of draft resister prosecutions of interned Japanese Americans, see MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR 
THEIR COUNTRY, supra note 4, at 131-60. 
 74. Abo v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Cal. 1948). 
 75. The total number of plaintiffs apparently increased substantially as the case proceeded.  “By 
the spring of 1959, the tally was as follows: 5,766 Japanese Americans had renounced.  Of these, 5,409 
had applied for restoration of their citizenship.  And 4,987 were successful.”  John Christgau, Collins 
versus the World: The Fight to Restore Citizenship to Japanese American Renunciants of World War II, 
54 PAC. HIST. REV. 1, 30 (1985). 
 76. Id. at 10, 13; see McGrath v. Abo, 186 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1951). 
 77. See id. at 769 (quoting F.R.C.P. 23(a)(3)). 
 78. Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Substance, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 575 (1997). 
 79. See Abo, 186 F.2d at 769-71.  See generally Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1318, 1331-53 (1976). 
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several rights to renunciation in which each had his several burden of proof 
places a heavy burden on the court . . . .”80 
Burden of proof became the central question in the case.  “The record 
shows the certainty that many of the 4315 plaintiffs who voluntarily renounced 
were disloyal to the United States.”81  The importance of the task of identifying 
these “disloyal” citizens, Denman argued, was obvious: “In a cold war, already 
existing when the case were tried and now with the hot war in Korea, the fed-
eral courts should be more vigilant than ever that the massing of 4315 plain-
tiffs . . . does not conceal the facts as to such enemy minded renunciants.”82  
Thus, at least with respect to adult plaintiffs, “the burden of proof is on each to 
show that he was brought to a condition of mind by his treatment while in-
terned which destroyed his free action in renouncing.”83  This conclusion, by it-
self, would seem to echo the analysis of Judge Mathes in Murakami.84  But in 
Abo, Chief Justice Denman immediately recalled and applied his own analysis 
in the earlier case: 
The evidence shows that all such plaintiffs, save 83 . . . , were imprisoned at Tule Lake 
when they renounced.  It further shows the oppressive conditions prevailing there 
were in large part caused or made possible by the action and inaction of those gov-
ernment officials responsible for them during their internment.  Because of the op-
pressiveness of this imprisonment by the government officials, a rebuttable presump-
tion arises as to those confined at Tule Lake that their acts of renunciation were 
involuntary.85 
A procedural choreography followed: “This presumption requires the defen-
dants to go forward with the evidence and produce evidence rebutting it.  When 
such evidence is introduced, the presumption disappears, but the fact of the co-
ercive conditions remains as a part of each plaintiff’s showing to support his in-
dividual burden of proof.”86 
In the course of the hearings below, it appeared, the government had al-
ready satisfied its burden in many cases by identifying groups of individual 
plaintiffs and indicating evidence the government could introduce concerning 
each group.  Judge Goodman had ruled otherwise—wrongly, from the perspec-
tive of the appellate panel.87  But the government had also agreed that, in almost 
all instances, it would treat as decisive written statements of individual plaintiffs 
 
 80. Abo, 186 F.2d at 774. 
 81. Id. at 771. 
 82. Id. at 772. 
 83. Id. at 773.  Concerning individuals under the age of eighteen, see id. at 772. 
 84. “The facts of the wrongful conditions prevailing at Tule Lake, common to each of the plaintiffs 
imprisoned there, are substantially the same as those in the findings in the case of Murakami v. 
Acheson, reported on appeal here in Acheson v. Murakami . . . where they are fully set forth.  In that 
case, however, evidence was offered by each plaintiff showing that she individually was coerced into an 
involuntary renunciation of her citizenship.”  Id. at 771. 
 85. Id. at 773. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 773-74. 
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as to why they had felt coerced.88  There was thus no “necessity of proof in each 
individual case of the conditions at Tule Lake”—both “a large saving” proce-
durally, and (it seemed) a just acknowledgement of both government concerns 
as to particular individuals and the adverse consequences, for the class as a 
whole, of the government’s own improper conduct.89  Chief Judge Denman 
noted that “[t]he Attorney General has indicated an appreciation of the wrongs 
done to those whose renunciations were forced by the conditions at Tule Lake, 
described in the Murakami decision, . . . and has announced that the decision 
‘would be accepted and applied by . . . the Department of Justice . . . in all fu-
ture cases of this kind.’”90 
IV 
CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS 
Together, Murakami and Abo are remarkable—judicial outrage and ingenu-
ity uncommonly conjoined—yet the two opinions are only occasionally noted.91  
It is not as though contested claims of renunciation of citizenship no longer 
arise.92  The approach that Judge Denman took in the two cases, however, dif-
fers markedly from the usual forms of argument about renunciation prominent 
in the past half century or so.  This difference might explain the marginal status 
of Murakami and Abo (although there may be many other explanations as 
well).  Juxtaposing the two opinions and their mainstream counterparts is useful 
anyway as a first step.  The premises organizing the Denman efforts carry asso-
ciations that, once evident, mark the politics at Tule Lake, glimpsed in The 
Spoilage, as surprisingly resonant, indeed emblematic of constitutional funda-
mentals. 
A. Usual Forms of Argument 
The question of renunciation appears, most of the time, to be bound up with 
the question whether the United States government can revoke American citi-
 
 88. Id. at 774.  The work involved in gathering the written statements from the class members, it 
seems, accounts for the long life of the case after remand.  See Christgau, supra note 75, at 28-31. 
 89. Abo, 186 F.2d at 774.  Renunciants who proceeded individually, outside the context of the class 
action, sometimes faced much harder going.  See, e.g., Murakami v. Dulles, 221 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1955) 
(Denman, C.J.). 
 90. Abo, 186 F.2d at 771. 
 91. Murikami is included, in usefully edited form, along with a helpful introduction and notes, in 
ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL L. IZUMI, JERRY KANG & FRANK H. WU, RACE, 
RIGHTS AND REPARATION 227-32 (2001).  In the course of an important essay, Neil Gotanda pointedly 
discusses renunciation at Tule Lake, but does not explore the Ninth Circuit opinions as such.  See Neil 
Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political Community Among “We the People,” 76 ORE. 
L. REV. 233, 242-45 (1997).  As Professor Gotanda notes,  Japanese American renunciation of citizen-
ship at Tule Lake and elsewhere does not figure in PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, 
CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985), notwithstand-
ing the central place of expatriation in the (controversial) argument of this well-known work.  See Go-
tanda, supra, 76 ORE. L. REV. at 242. 
 92. See, e.g., David A. Martin, New Rules on Dual Nationality for a Democratizing Globe: Between 
Rejection and Embrace, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1999). 
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zenship for reasons of state—even if contrary to the wishes of the individuals af-
fected—or whether citizenship is instead to be understood as a matter of indi-
vidual choice and right.93  In Perkins v. Elg,94 decided just before World War II, 
Chief Justice Hughes depicted citizenship as a matter of individual election – if 
not necessarily exclusively so.  His opinion deftly blended constitutional lan-
guage, international understandings, executive practice, and statutory language 
as it then stood.  In principle, it appeared, “loss of citizenship” might be the re-
sult of “voluntary action” by an individual amounting to “binding choice,” at 
least in the absence of a “treaty or statute having that effect.”95  Almost twenty 
years later, Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion in Perez v. Brownell96 treated 
the question whether Congress could strip Americans of their citizenship for 
voting in foreign elections as chiefly a question of governmental necessities and 
therefore of power, and not individual right: 
The Government must be able not only to deal affirmatively with foreign nations, as it 
does through the maintenance of diplomatic relations with them and the protection of 
American citizens sojourning within their territories.  It must also be able to reduce to 
a minimum the frictions that are unavoidable in a world of sovereigns sensitive in mat-
ters touching their dignity and interests.97 
Frankfurter also acknowledged, though, that “Congress can attach loss of citi-
zenship only as a consequence of conduct engaged in voluntarily”—this conclu-
sion, the Perez opinion suggested opaquely, followed as a matter “[o]f course.”98  
Chief Justice Warren dissented, invoking what he took to be basic principles: 
“the citizens themselves are sovereign, and their citizenship is not subject to the 
general powers of their government.”99  Individual U.S. citizens were free to 
“exercise . . . the right of expatriation,” and thereby to renounce citizenship 
themselves, or to disclose their choices by taking “other actions in derogation of 
undivided allegiance to this country.”100  But voting in a foreign election was not, 
in and of itself, such an action.101 
Afroyim v. Rusk overruled Perez. 102  Justice Black emphasized the language 
of the Fourteenth Amendment:  “‘All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States . . . are citizens of the United States . . . .’”103  The constitutional declara-
tion, he argued, pointed to a conclusion much like Chief Justice Warren’s: 
 
 93. Addressing somewhat different questions, Professor Aleinikoff draws (and persuasively elabo-
rates on) a similar distinction between sovereignty-based and citizen-based conceptions of the state.  
See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY 12-18, 39-46 (2002).  Reason of 
state and individual rights, of course, need not be conceived entirely separately.  See, e.g., RICHARD 
TUCK, PHILOSOPHY AND GOVERNMENT, 1572-1651, at xii-xv (1993). 
 94. 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939). 
 95. Id. 
 96. 356 U.S. 44 (1958). 
 97. Id. at 57. 
 98. Id. at 61; accord  Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 133 (1958). 
 99. Perez, 356 U.S. at 65 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. at 68 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 101. See id. at 75-78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 102. 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967). 
 103. Id. at 262 (Justice Black’s ellipses). 
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There is no indication in these words of a fleeting citizenship, good at the moment it is 
acquired but subject to destruction by the Government at any time.  Rather the 
Amendment can most reasonably be read as defining a citizenship which a citizen 
keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.104 
Vance v. Terrazas105 started from the same assumption.  “[E]xpatriation depends 
on the will of the citizen rather than on the will of Congress”106—as a result, acts 
of individuals deemed by the government to be acts of renunciation must be not 
only voluntary, but specifically intended as renunciatory.107 
Terrazas, it is easy to think, “reaffirmed the central message of Afroyim.”108  
But in Terrazas, Justice White also declared that specific intent, like voluntari-
ness, need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence.  Congress 
was free, as it already had, to specify acts that were presumptively voluntary, 
leaving individuals with the burden of arguing otherwise (the government re-
taining the burden to show specific intent to renounce).109  White’s burden of 
proof ruling in particular marked a sharp break with previous Supreme Court 
thinking.110  In Nishikawa v. Dulles,111 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the 
Court, had stated that the government bore “the burden of persuading the trier 
of fact by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence that the act showing re-
nunciation of citizenship was voluntarily performed.”112  Justice Frankfurter, 
concurring, agreed.113  Terrazas concluded that Nishikawa “was not rooted in the 
Constitution,” Justice White noting the Nishikawa court’s own acknowledge-
ment that it “was acting in the absence of legislative guidance.”114  Congress was 
free to jettison the clear and convincing standard.  Warren and Frankfurter in-
deed wrote their opinions in Nishikawa in ways that emphasized judicial 
thought processes more than constitutional texts.  Cases they cited, however, 
plainly signaled that constitutional presuppositions both underlay and organ-
ized evidentiary analyses and statutory constructions.115 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. 444 U.S. 252 (1980). 
 106. Id. at 260. 
 107. See id. at 260-63. 
 108. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1483 (1986). 
 109. See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 264-70. 
 110. Two of the dissents in Terrazas—like Afroyim and Perez, a five-four decision—are insistent in 
this regard.  See id. at 271-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part); id. at 273-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting in 
part).  Justice White, notably, had joined Justice Harlan’s dissent in Afroyim.  See Afroyim v. Rusk,  
387 U.S. 253, 268. 
 111. 356 U.S. 129 (1958). 
 112. Id. at 135. 
 113. Id. at 141-42 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). 
 114. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 265. 
 115. Thus, Chief Justice Warren linked Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943), in 
which Justice Murphy emphasized his own sense of equity in justifying the clear and convincing stan-
dard, with Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion in United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 197 (1956) 
(Douglas, J., concurring), juxtaposing constitutional considerations and statutory construction.  See Ni-
shikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129,  134-35 & n.6.  Warren also characterized the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard as of a piece with what he took to be the clear statement requirement announced in 
Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 337 (1939), given constitutional resonance by Justice Jackson, writing for 
the Court in Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 133 (1952), which Warren also cited.  See Nishikawa, 
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It should be apparent that Terrazas was something of a back-door revival of 
Perez.  To be sure, the government now needed to proceed case-by-case.116  But 
the focus on individual “will”—on voluntariness and specific intent—afforded 
the government the opportunity to further its agendas obliquely by questioning 
assertions of individual renunciants rather than by asserting its own interests di-
rectly as before.  The relaxation of the government’s burden of proof marked 
this opportunity as often realizable.  Terrazas organized a new casuistry.  De-
pending on whether the government wished to claim that renunciation had oc-
curred or instead chose to resist the individual’s claim of renunciation, individu-
als would be characterized as acting inconsistently, given all the circumstances, 
and therefore as failing to evince a specific intent to renounce citizenship,117 or 
their acts of renunciation, taken alone, would be depicted as sufficiently clear to 
overshadow complicating facts.118  In every case, thanks to the preponderance 
standard, government characterizations and individual assertions figured as 
equally plausible initially—however the final balance was struck in any particu-
lar case.119  Ex ante, at least, there would have seemed to be no real priority af-
forded an individual’s rights. 
B. The Constitution Glimpsed From Tule Lake 
Abo, it might seem, anticipates Terrazas.  The burden of proof ends up with 
the government—but (on its face) does not appear to be substantial.  There is, 
though, a large difference.  Chief Judge Denman reserves judgment even after 
the government satisfies its burden of production:  “[T]he fact of the coercive 
conditions remains.”120  The government is still on trial.  In Terrazas, Justice 
White treats the individual as the exclusive focus. 
It is the individual, after Terrazas, who is interrogated; it is the government 
that plays the part of the critic.  The structure of politics at Tule Lake, as it ap-
pears in The Spoilage recounting, was precisely opposite.  Individuals repeat-
edly beset by government acts—initial evacuation, internment, loyalty testing, 
segregation, inadequate provisions for housing, food, work—repeatedly at-
tempted to organize means of holding officials to account, to undo or to miti-
gate official acts.  These attempts repeatedly failed.  Processes of political or-
ganization did not therefore terminate, but changed—in response they became 
 
356 U.S. at 136, 133.  Justice Frankfurter’s Nishikawa concurrence cited his own opinion for the Su-
preme Court in Baumgartner v. United States, invoking substantive constitutional commitments to ex-
plain application of a clear and convincing standard, 322 U.S. 665, 675-76 (1944).  See Nishikawa, 356 
U.S. at 141. 
 116. Chief Justice Warren’s critique of the overbreadth of the statute addressed in Perez retained its 
force.  See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 76-77 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 117. See, e.g., Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., 951 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) 
 118. See, e.g., Richards v. Secretary of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 119. Government argumentative strategies do not prevail in every case.  See, e.g., Breyer v. 
Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 327 (3rd Cir. 2003).  And it is not enough, of course, for government officials simply 
to argue that they were not persuaded by an individual’s claims.  See, e.g., Rivera v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 
835, 841-43 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 120. McGrath v. Abo, 186 F.2d 766, 773 (1951). 
07_GUDRIDGE.DOC 11/22/2005  11:34 AM 
98 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:81 
increasingly confrontational, both formally and informally.  Official reactions in 
turn reinforced an atmosphere of conspiracy and suspicion, of diffusion and es-
calation of hostility (ultimately encompassing acts of violence).  A politics of 
engagement increasingly gave way to a politics of repudiation—as a means 
throughout the period of achieving immediate ends (personal safety, family 
unity, community) and also of expressing opposition to official acts and failures 
to act.  Renunciation of citizenship was simply one form of political action 
within this larger context. 
For the reader of The Spoilage, renunciation does not appear to have been a 
result of hysteria; rather, it seems an understandable response under the cir-
cumstances—a response that may have promised short-term safety, a response 
marked by the cumulative failures of official processes as one of the few avail-
able.  Within these terms, labeling renunciation as not “voluntary” seems inapt.  
The decision to renounce citizenship is easy to depict as considered and as justi-
fiable in context.  Of course, if renunciation is thought to have been a judicious 
or prudent choice, the conclusions of Chief Judge Denman in Murakami and 
Abo that most Tule Lake renunciations were not “voluntary” and therefore 
need not have legal effect would seem to become open to question.  In Abo 
Denman himself had quoted language of the Supreme Court that might have 
been thought to fit the case:  “‘[T]he forsaking of American citizenship, even in 
a difficult situation, as a matter of expediency, with attempted excuse of such 
conduct later when crass material considerations suggest that course, is not du-
ress.’”121  But if Denman used the term “voluntary” (available legal formulas 
would seem to have required its use122), he appears to have been working with a 
somewhat different notion in fact.  In a later case, he summarized Murakami 
this way: 
[B]y orders of an American General, carried out by American police and other offi-
cers, 70,000 Nisei American citizens of the Pacific Coast States were indiscriminately 
confined for over two years in barbed wire stockades where they were placed in over-
crowded prison-like structures.  This was done though no act of sabotage by any Japa-
nese citizen or much less any Nisei had been committed.  That is to say, American of-
ficers . . . treated the Nisei as “outcasts” in the full sense of that word.  They were cast 
out of their homes for over two years, their families often separated, with a huge loss 
of property sold under the evacuation pressure of from one to ten days notice, and 
they had destroyed their businesses, their established professions and the earning 
power of mechanics and laborers.  Over four thousand such Nisei under pressure of 
that outrageous treatment gave up their citizenship.  We held . . . that such acts of de-
naturalization were involuntary.123 
 
 121. Id. at 772, (quoting Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 502 n.18 (1950), quoting Doreau 
v. Marshall, 170 F.2d 721, 724 (3rd Cir. 1948)). 
 122. See Dos Reis v. Nicolls, 161 F.2d 860, 862, 868 (1st Cir. 1947). 
 123. Fukumoto v. Dulles, 216 F.2d 553, 554 (9th Cir. 1954).  Fukumoto, an American citizen living in 
Japan in September, 1941, at that point renounced his Japanese citizenship, but (unable to leave Japan) 
successfully applied to recover that citizenship in 1943.  He argued after the war that his renewal of 
Japanese citizenship was not tantamount to renunciation of his American citizenship because his re-
newal was a response to his outcast status in Japan and his consequent harsh treatment by police and 
other authorities there.  See id. at 553-55.  Chief Judge Denman discussed Murakami in the course of 
assessing the plausibility of Fukumoto’s contentions concerning his mistreatment by Japanese officials.  
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Because the internment regime—in particular at Tule Lake—was “outrageous,” 
Japanese Americans were able to argue that their renunciations of American 
citizenship were without effect. 
“Outrageous”:  Renunciation should not count because the Tule Lake occu-
pants should not have been put in a position in which renunciation appeared to 
be a reasonable choice.  The great part of the Murakami opinion is given over 
to demonstrating that government acts and failures to act underlay the circum-
stances arguing in favor of renunciation.  This did not mean that renunciation 
was utterly legally irrelevant.  It meant, rather, that the Tule Lake occupants 
had the option to revoke renunciation if they chose to do so.  Such an option is 
extraordinary, it might seem, however appropriate in the circumstances.  Are 
the Murakami and Abo decisions also extraordinary?  Their acknowledgements 
of the “outrageousness” of internment and their recognition of the option af-
forded Tule Lake renunciants may be notable examples of ad hoc equity, but 
nothing more. 
In Abo Chief Judge Denman indicated, as though anticipating criticism, that 
he thought the rebuttable presumption that acts of renunciation were involun-
tary could claim an analog in contract law.  He cited Samuel Williston124—this (it 
appears) is the pertinent passage: 
In the absence of a relationship between the parties to a transaction which tends to 
give one dominance over the other, undue influence must generally be proved by the 
party setting it up, and will not be presumed. . . .  When such a relationship of domi-
nance of one party exists, however, as is ordinarily the case where there is a fiduciary 
or confidential relation between the parties, the courts of equity hold that it raises a 
presumption of undue influence and throws upon the dominant party the burden of 
establishing the fairness of the transaction and that it was the free act of the other 
party. . . .  Indeed this doctrine is applicable to any situation where influence was ac-
quired or confidence reposed in fact, whether the basis of the relation is moral, social, 
domestic, or merely personal.125 
At first glance, Williston simply raises a new set of explanation-demanding 
terms—“relationship,” “fairness,” “confidence”—in place of “voluntariness” or 
“outrageousness.”  The pertinent relationship, though, is plain:  At the time 
they renounced citizenship, the Japanese Americans at Tule Lake were, of 
course, United States citizens.  (Chief Judge Denman labeled the occupants of 
Tule Lake, over and over, as “American citizens,” “loyal Americans,” “free 
citizens,” “our incarcerated fellow citizens.”126)  As such, they were participants 
along with the United States government in a distinctive and complex web of 
mutual obligations.  This is, it turns out, starting point enough. 
 
“It is well in cases of human motivation of people of other races that we consider our own psychology.”  
Id. at 554. 
 124. See Abo, 186 F.2d at 773. 
 125. 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1625A, pp. 4542-45 (rev. ed. 1937), quoted in Trustees of 
Williams Hospital v. Nisbet, 14 S.E.2d 64, 76-77 (Ga. 1941). 
 126. See, e.g., Acheson v. Murakami, 176 F.2d 953, 954, 955. 
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1. A Jurisprudential Context: 
A central passage of one of the great documents of American constitutional 
law, an opinion issued by Attorney General Edward Bates on November 29, 
1862, identifies fundamental propositions organizing this relationship.  Bates 
addressed “the question whether or not colored men can be citizens of the 
United States.”127  He responded affirmatively: 
In my opinion, the Constitution uses the word citizen only to express the political 
quality of the individual in his relations to the nation; to declare that he is a member of 
the body politic, and bound to it by the reciprocal obligation of allegiance on the one 
side and protection on the other.  And I have no knowledge of any other kind of po-
litical citizenship, higher or lower, statal or national, or of any other sense in which the 
word has been used in the Constitution, or can be used properly in the laws of the 
United States.  The phrase, “a citizen of the United States,” without addition or quali-
fication, means neither more nor less than a member of the nation.  And all such are, 
politically and legally, equal—the child in the cradle and its father in the Senate, are 
equally citizens of the United States.  And it needs no argument to prove that every 
citizen of a State is, necessarily, a citizen of the United States; and to me it is equally 
clear that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the particular State in which 
he is domiciled.128 
The Bates opinion is noteworthy, in part, precisely because its notion of “the 
reciprocal obligation of allegiance . . . and protection” was not at all original.  
Main themes in the Declaration of Independence are elaborations or applica-
tions of this formula,129 and the idea was not new in 1776.130  Edward Coke, fixing 
the status of Scottish residents within English law after the King of Scotland’s 
accession to the English throne (James I), could readily depict allegiance and 
protection as reciprocal in Calvin’s Case in 1608, as already well-grounded in 
English law, treated there as a matter of natural and not local law, and thus as a 
principal basis for concluding that Scots (postnati at least) were no longer 
“aliens” within English law.131  Henry VIII’s surrender and regrant “Irish consti-
 
 127. Citizenship, 10 Ops. Atty. Gen. 382, 382 (1862) (Bates, A.J.) (emphasis in original).  The ques-
tion had been put by Secretary of the Treasury Chase, ostensibly to determine whether African Ameri-
cans might captain ships required by law to be commanded by American citizens. 
 128. Id. at 388.  This austere answer was, at the time, both legally and politically deft.  It showed that 
Bates (and thus the Lincoln administration) regarded Dred Scott v. Sanford as beside the point and the 
analysis pointed to a properly emancipatory conclusion, but it stopped short of addressing (well in ad-
vance of the end of the Civil War) the precise rights—for example, the right to vote—that freed slaves 
would possess. 
 129. Jefferson’s notes are explicit: 
That as to the king, we had been bound to him by allegiance, but that this bond was now dis-
solved by his assent to the late act of parliament, by which he declares us out of his protection, 
and by his levying war on us, a fact which had long ago proved us out of his protection; it be-
ing a certain position in law that allegiance and protection are reciprocal, the one ceasing 
when the other is withdrawn[.] 
Thomas Jefferson, Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress (June 7-Aug. 1, 1776), in 1 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 311 (Julian P. Bond et al. eds., 1950). 
 130. Concerning American use of the formula in the run-up to the Revolutionary War, see JAMES 
H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 165-72, 174-75, & 179 
(1978). 
 131. Calvin’s Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1a (1608), reprinted in 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 379 (King’s Bench) (1907).  
Concerning English law, Coke glossed Glanville (among others): 
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tutional revolution” structured its legal merger of England and Ireland precisely 
within these reciprocal terms.132  The gist of the idea is visible in early medieval 
politics.133 At least from the perspective of political theory, Thomas Hobbes was 
the most important of Bates’s predecessors.  The last paragraph of Leviathan 
begins: 
And thus I have brought to an end my Discourse of Civill and Ecclesiasticall Govern-
ment, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without ap-
plication, and without other designe, than to set before mens eyes the mutuall Rela-
tion between Protection and Obedience; of which the condition of Humane Nature, 
and the Laws Divine, (both Naturall and Positive) require an inviolable observation.134 
 Familiar Hobbesian preoccupations figure prominently in Respublica v. 
Chapman,135 a notable early case in American constitutional law.  Chapman re-
sided in Pennsylvania until December 26, 1776, when he left, joined the British 
army, and was ultimately captured and charged with treason.  Chapman con-
tended that, at the time he left Pennsylvania, “no government existed to which 
he could owe allegiance as a subject.”136  Chief Justice McKean, charging the 
jury in the case, concluded that the government under the new Pennsylvania 
 
But between the Sovereign and the subject there is without comparison a higher and greater 
connexion: for as the subject owed to the King his true and faithful ligeance and obedience, so 
the Sovereign is to govern and protect his subjects, regere et protegere subditos: so as between 
the Sovereign and subject there is duplex et reciprocum ligamen; quia sicut subditus regi tenetur 
ad obededietiam, ita rex subdito tenetur ad protectionem: merito igitur ligeantia dictur a ligando, 
quia continet in se duplex ligamen. 
Id. at 382.  On the common law characterization of the reciprocal obligation as natural law, see id. at 
391-94.  Useful discussions of Calvin’s Case include, e.g., GLENN BURGESS, THE POLITICS OF THE 
ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1603-1642, at 127-
29 (1992); KETTNER, supra note 130, at 13-28; Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the 
Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439 (2003); Polly J. 
Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73 
(1997). 
 132. “Surrender and regrant” was the legal ritual within which Irish nobility acknowledged the au-
thority of Henry VIII as King of Ireland, gave up their prior claims to status and property, and accepted 
Henry’s grant to them of more or less the same status and property (now defined within the terms of 
English law).  For more and less enthusiastic accounts, see BRENDAN BRADSHAW, THE IRISH 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 196-200, 213-16 (1979); CIARAN 
BRADY, THE CHIEF GOVERNORS 25-40 (1994); STEVEN G. ELLIS, IRELAND IN THE AGE OF THE 
TUDORS, 1447-1603, at 149-60, 254-55 (1998). 
 133. See BARBARA H. ROSENWEIN, NEGOTIATING SPACE: POWER, RESTRAINT, AND PRIVILEGES 
OF IMMUNITY IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE 106-12, 130-34 (1999). 
 134. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 560 (Barnes & Noble 2004) (1651).  David Hume restated the 
proposition in more immediately subversive terms: 
I seek, therefore, some such interest more immediately connected with government, and 
which may be at once the original motive to its institution, and the source of our obedience to 
it.  This interest I find to consist in the security and protection, which we enjoy in political so-
ciety, and which we can never attain, when perfectly free and independent.  As interest, there-
fore, is the immediate sanction of government, the one can have no longer being than the 
other; and whenever the civil magistrate carries his oppression so far as to render his authority 
perfectly intolerable, we are no longer bound to submit to it.  The cause ceases; the effect 
must cease also. 
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 352 (David F. Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., 2000) 
(1737-40). 
 135. 1 Dall. 53 (Pa. 1781). 
 136. Id. at 55. 
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constitution dated from November 28, 1776, when members of the Executive 
Council were selected (the new legislature having already assembled), even 
though the Council did not actually meet for the first time until March 4, 1777: 
[A]ll its members were chosen, and the legislature was completely organized: so that 
there did antecedently exist a power competent to redress grievances, to afford protec-
tion, and generally, to execute the laws; and allegiance being naturally due to such a 
power, we are of opinion, that from the moment it was created, the crime of high trea-
son might have been committed by any person, who was then a subject of the com-
monwealth.137 
Straightforward enough.  But McKean also observed that “Pennsylvania was 
not a nation at war with another nation; but a country in a state of civil war.”138  
“In civil wars, every man chooses his party”—Did that mean that residents pos-
sessed “an unrestrainable right to remove” within “a reasonable time” (as they 
would have if an “old government” were dissolved and a “new one” formed)?139  
The state legislature had, on February 11, 1777, declared that “‘all and every 
person . . . now inhabiting, &c. within the limits of this state; or that shall volun-
tarily come into the same hereafter to inhabit, &c. do owe, and shall pay alle-
giance, &c.’”140  McKean made much of the limits of this language: 
[A] discrimination is evidently made . . . meaning that this election to adhere to the 
British government, should not expose the party to any future punishment. . . .  [W]e 
think the design and intention of the Legislature sufficiently appears to have been, to 
allow a choice of his party to every man, until the 11th of February, 1777; and that no 
act savoring of treason, done before that period, shall incur the penalties of the law.141 
2. The Implicit Constitution of Murakami and Abo 
Murakami and Abo—like Chapman—are “election” cases.  It is not clear 
what precisely Chief Justice McKean meant by “civil war,” crucially his precon-
dition for “choice of . . . party.”  Thomas Hobbes, however, knew: “every man, 
against every man,” not just actual conflict, but “the known disposition 
thereto,”142 a state of nature conceived as a state of mind—“the mutual fear of 
one another.”143  It followed, for Hobbes, that “the Office of the Soveraign” was 
therefore “the procuration of the safety of the people.”144  This did not mean 
simply “bare Preservation,” but that “Justice be equally administered to all de-
grees of People,” and before this, that “every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice 
to be taught . . . to cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbors, by 
violence, or fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs.”145  
 
 137. Id. at 57. 
 138. Id. at 58 (emphasis in original). 
 139. Id. at 57. 
 140. Id. (emphases in Chapman’s quotation). 
 141. Id. at 58.  On Chapman and other cases of the period effectively recognizing the right of elec-
tion, see KETTNER, supra note 130, at 193-98. 
 142. HOBBES, supra note 134, at 91. 
 143. THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW: NATURAL AND POLITIC 100 (Ferdinand Tonnies 
ed., 2d ed. 1969) (1640). 
 144. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 134, at 259. 
 145. Id. at 259, 264, 266. 
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“But if it be the duty of princes to restrain the factious, much more does it con-
cern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions themselves.”146  Chief Judge 
Denman’s conclusions in Murakami and Abo follow immediately—perhaps 
even more straightforwardly than Chief Justice McKean’s ruling in Chapman.  
Absent protection, allegiance is no longer obligatory.  Absent protection, alle-
giance becomes, again, a matter of choice. 147 
The Constitution, it might be said, “does not enact Mr. Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan.”148  But the opinion of Attorney General Bates associating citizen-
ship and protection obviously anticipated the wording of the not-yet drafted 
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.149  The Civil War and Reconstruc-
 
 146. THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE: PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS CONCERNING GOVERNMENT AND 
SOCIETY, reprinted in MAN AND CITIZEN 266 (Bernard Gert ed., 1972). 
 147. As Hobbes put it, 
The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to another, or others, the right of pro-
tecting and defending himself by his own power, is the security which he expecteth thereby, of 
protection and defence from those to whom he doth so relinquish it. . . .  And therefore when 
there is not such a sovereign power erected, as may afford this security; it is to be understood 
that every man’s right of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth still with 
him. 
THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, supra note 143, at 110 (Ferdinand Tonnies ed., 2d ed. 
1969) (1640).  Remarkably, much the same point is made in Scholer v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 353 
(N.D. Ill. 1948), one of the cases that the Supreme Court cited in Savorgnan v. United States (itself 
cited in Abo, 186 F.2d at 772) as an example of “real duress.”  See 338 U.S. 491 at 502 n.18: 
The court believes that American citizenship is a priceless heritage involving not only privi-
leges but duties and responsibilities, and that among those duties and responsibilities are pri-
marily loyalty and allegiance to the United States.  However, . . . the court also recognized 
that self-preservation is nature’s first law, and that it is quite natural for mothers and fathers to 
seek in every way to preserve the lives of their children when their safety is threatened.  
Where an American citizen finds himself and his family . . . in a theatre of war, . . . facing the 
gravest of dangers, even possible death or internment, and in this extremity, on the advice of 
officials of the foreign state where he happens to be, makes application for foreign citizenship 
in an effort to preserve the lives and safety of his family, . . . I am of the opinion that under 
such circumstances . . . [there] is not such a voluntary renunciation or abandonment of . . . na-
tionality as to forfeit . . . American-born citizenship. 
Scholer, 75 F. Supp. at 355 (the case itself concerned Mrs. Scholer). 
 148. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”).  It should not matter whether Ed-
ward Bates, or Lyman Trumbull and Jacob Howard (the Senators seemingly chiefly responsible for 
drafting the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) read Leviathan or, even if they did, un-
derstood themselves as taking a Hobbesian approach.  It should not be the case, either, that something 
akin to a well-defined “constitutional unconscious” or other inescapable “deep structure” must be 
deemed to be part of the generally agreed-upon content of American constitutional law.  To be sure, 
any sufficiently elaborate accumulation of constitutional materials might invite exercises in indexing—
formulation of propositions perceived to be implicit within, and thus organizing, the larger body of ma-
terials.  See, e.g., Patrick O. Gudridge, “The Rule of Law Without and Within Constitutional Law” 
(2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).  The notion of the reciprocal obligations of alle-
giance and protection, it appears, is one such index.  Hobbes addresses this notion especially helpfully 
because he deploys it so straightforwardly.  There are, of course, other indexing terms that might also 
be put to use (with respect, inter alia, to the language of the Fourteenth Amendment).  All such index-
ing terms are plainly overlays—should be understood as arguments, as proposed means of understand-
ing and organizing other materials, as welcome only insofar as they indeed deepen the resonance of the 
constitutional provisions (or judicial, administrative, or legislative pronouncements) that they pick out.  
Constitutional law can encompass more than “enactments” even if “enactments” supply its persisting 
elements and thus ultimate identifiers. 
 149. This is the well-known language: 
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tion are surely reminders that Hobbesian themes are readily discernible within 
the American experience.  The Fourteenth Amendment specification of who 
were (and are) United States citizens is enough, moreover, within the recipro-
cating accounts of allegiance and protection, to impose an obligation upon the 
federal government very much akin to the duties owed by state governments 
that the Fourteenth Amendment took as its immediate task to make newly fed-
erally enforceable.150  It seems hardly necessary, in thinking constitutionally 
about the circumstances of the renunciants at Tule Lake, to proceed within or-
dinary doctrinal filigree—but if a more recent judicial response seems necessary 
to second Chief Judge Denman’s reactions, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
in Romer v. Evans is surely sufficient.151 
These observations suggest several overlapping corollaries: 
Within the logic of citizenship, the reciprocal responsibilities of allegiance 
and protection replace sometimes problematic, seemingly ad hoc notions of af-
firmative obligations with accounts of persistent preexisting duties.  The Four-
teenth Amendment inscribes this logic.  Criteria for citizenship are not pre-
sented as matters of choice for federal or state governments.  Criteria are 
defined constitutionally, imposed on these governments, in the process also im-
 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The juxtaposition of citizenship and the state’s duty to protect is ob-
scured somewhat by the drafting history.  One version or another of what would become the Equal 
Protection Clause was present from the start.  Representative Bingham began the process on January 
12, 1866, by proposing: “The Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to se-
cure to all persons in every state within this Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty and 
property.”  BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON 
RECONSTRUCTION 46 (1914).  But the first sentence of section 1 was not the work of the drafting 
committee; it was added in the course of final Senate debate.  See W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK 
RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 306-07 (1935).  The roughly similar citizenship language of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866—immediately antecedent—provoked more congressional discussion; that debate 
clearly shows the influence of the Bates opinion.  See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIL IDEALS 306 (1997).  
Thomas Cooley—the great constitutional commentator of the period—also referenced the Bates opin-
ion in a discussion of the citizenship clause that emphasized the conjunction of citizenship, allegiance, 
and protection.  See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 654 (4th ed. 1873) (notes and additions by Thomas M. Cooley). 
Caveat: There is a longstanding line of thinking challenging attempts to take too seriously possibili-
ties of associating theoretical underpinnings with the language of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION 96-131 (1999) (explor-
ing the Fairman/Crosskey debate).  Thus, William E. Nelson concluded, even after he had recognized 
(inter alia) the prominence of Calvin’s Case and the allegiance/protection reciprocal within the antebel-
lum legal thinking that was the first context for the Fourteenth Amendment: “The framers and ratifiers 
understood their task in office to be the moral one of proclaiming vague principles of civic reformation, 
not the academic or bureaucratic one of engaging in precise conceptual definition. “WILLIAM E. 
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 89 
(1988); see id. at 25-26 (discussing Calvin’s Case). 
 150. If the interrelationship of duties of allegiance and protection is understood as a constitutional 
proposition, no notion of “reverse incorporation” is necessary to account for equal protection con-
straints on federal officials. 
 151. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 633-34 (1996). 
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posing the duty of protection.152  As a result, there is an always already estab-
lished responsibility on the part of governments not simply to steer clear of af-
firmative misconduct, but to protect citizens in need.  Chief Judge Denman’s 
Murakami opinion plainly takes as one of its points of departure the prejudices 
of General De Witt, but it just as conspicuously underscores the myriad failures 
of camp administrators to address satisfactorily the needs of Tule Lake occu-
pants.  The Spoilage marks this administrative attention deficit as one of its cen-
tral themes.  For individuals, there is a corollary responsibility accompanying 
the constitutional declaration of citizenship, also always already established, to 
respond to the demands of government under siege or otherwise in need.153 
These reciprocal duties do not lapse—except in cases of clear refusal of respon-
sibility, by either government (as at Tule Lake) or citizens (“hard war” strate-
gies adopted by Union forces in the Civil War claimed this justification154).  Be-
cause their coexistence threatens to become a cacophony of competing 
demands, claims of protection or allegiance may be recognized outright only in 
unambiguous circumstances—even if often addressed in terms one step re-
moved otherwise.155 
The situation at Tule Lake, especially as depicted within The Spoilage ac-
count, highlights the co-existence of double perspectives within constitutional 
 
 152. The Fourteenth Amendment’s definitions of citizenship stand somewhat outside the recurring 
debate about the meaning of “full” citizenship and historically and presently persisting forms of dis-
crimination regarding political rights in the United States (and elsewhere).  (For a notably magisterial 
overview, see David Abraham, Citizenship Solidarity and Rights Individualism: On the Decline of Na-
tional Citizenship in the U.S., Germany and Israel, Working Paper No. 53, Center for Comparative Im-
migration Studies, University of California—San Diego (May, 2002).)  Insofar as definitions of citizen-
ship are put to work in order to impose obligations (duties to protect) on governments, the citizenship 
definitions themselves need take only the minimal form of jurisdictional identifiers (“born or natural-
ized in the United States”) and qualifiers (“and subject to the jurisdiction thereof”).  The difficult 
work—and the attendant possibility of falling short—shows up in the course of specifying the meaning 
of “protection,” work aided only somewhat by addition of a prefix term like “equal.”  In addition, ju-
risdictional citizenship—because its first concern is government, not the individual—carries strong im-
plications with respect to when and whether governments can revoke citizenship, but does not (it would 
seem) necessarily derive those implications from straightforward notions of consent.  In principle, alle-
giance (and thus its repudiation) might be grounded otherwise.  See, e.g., HUME, supra note 134, at 347-
52.  Perhaps not surprisingly, Reconstruction legislators treated expatriation as a question not resolved 
by the Fourteenth Amendment itself.  For discussion of the Expatriation Act of 1868, in the course of 
arguing in favor of the priority of consent, see PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP 
WITHOUT CONSENT 72-89 (1985). 
 153. In Korematsu, Justice Black invoked this duty.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 at 
219.  Notably, he did not consider the reciprocal duty imposed upon government, or the consequences 
of governmental failure to meet its obligation.  Instead, he appears to have read governmental obliga-
tions in light of constitutional restrictions whose content he defined (seemingly narrowly) without re-
gard to their role in holding government to its duty. 
 154. See MARK GRIMSLEY, THE HARD HAND OF WAR: UNION MILITARY POLICY TOWARDS 
SOUTHERN CIVILIANS, 1861-65, at 171-204, 213 (1995).  Of course, other considerations—most notably, 
logistics—were also pertinent.  See, e.g., id. at 213-15. 
 155. The Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence only occasionally focuses on failures of 
protection as such.  See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 631, 633-34; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982) 
(addressing the government’s duty to protect as implicated by the government’s obligation not to deny 
education to children).  More often, emphasis falls on (the quintessentially Hobbesian) problems posed 
by legal reinforcements of popular antipathies and on failures of state governments to take sufficiently 
seriously those interests marked as significant within, e.g., the overall federal constitutional structure. 
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law.  Government and population ordinarily interact as though they are sepa-
rate entities.  Government processes present individuals with risks or opportu-
nities, present individuals with matters with which they deal—as individuals—as 
part of the progress of day-to-day life.  The conduct of individuals in turn de-
fines an environment within which government similarly proceeds.  The lan-
guage of allegiance and protection is precisely consonant—provides a schematic 
within which this interaction might be discerned and judged. 
Popular sovereignty taken seriously appears to confuse the language of alle-
giance and protection.  Government of the people, by the people, for the peo-
ple:  It is the population (as government) that demands allegiance (of itself); it 
is the population (as government) that owes the duty of protection (to itself).  
There are, of course, many famous attempts to make sense of the idea of popu-
lar sovereignty, to reconcile it with the existential experience of governments 
and populations as separate.156  One distinctive tack—taken by John Marshall, 
for example—does not treat the rhetoric of popular sovereignty as describing 
immediate facts of life.  Rather, popular sovereignty figures obliquely, as some-
thing like a hermeneutic stance:  It motivates and organizes distinctive under-
standings of a set of interrelated propositions by government officials who ac-
cept these propositions as constitutive of their offices, sometimes conceived 
broadly and sometimes narrowly.  These conceptions, in combination, thereby 
restrict the way that the officials act vis à vis the interests of ordinary people.  
The overall scheme—the interaction of individual elements interpreted broadly 
or narrowly in view of the premise of popular sovereignty—becomes a complex 
mechanism of protection.  In the tenth Federalist, James Madison had already 
showed how government institutions conceived in this way would precisely im-
plement the Hobbesian program, reducing popular factionalism (the risk of civil 
war), and securing both allegiance and protection. 
It is important to distinguish between popular sovereignty as it figures 
(however it figures) within the constitutional scheme, and acts of individuals 
that are exterior to the scheme as such that are nonetheless also constitutional in 
character.  Individuals often hold their own views concerning the substance or 
worth of all or parts of the extant constitutional scheme.  Large-scale changes in 
public opinions, expectations or commitments may significantly influence ele-
ments of official exercises in constitutional interpretation.  These propositions, 
undoubtedly true, can pose important questions (not always easily addressed) 
within constitutional law conceived as an already relatively well-defined map of 
governmental preoccupations.  But there is also a more fundamental class of 
cases:  instances in which individuals themselves in effect redraw the map— 
through their own actions themselves invoke, confirm, and bring to bear consti-
 
 156. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).  These efforts explore 
terms within which officials can (and should) regard the public at large as part of government.  Another 
approach considers circumstances in which officials are to be understood as part of the populace—to be 
treated on the same terms.  See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 386 (Peter Las-
lett ed. 1960) (1698). 
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tutional premises.157  It may well be, for example, that the acts of free (some only 
newly free) African Americans during and immediately after the Civil War, 
claiming and exercising the national citizenship that Attorney General Bates 
had asserted was theirs, contributed much to the sense of what had to be taken 
as already given, as “facts” not to be ignored, and thus helped (at least) drive 
the increasingly thorough-going drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment.158  The 
boycotts, sit-ins, and demonstrations of civil rights protestors in the 1950s and 
1960s surely themselves amended conceptions of constitutional rights.159 Renun-
ciation of citizenship at Tule Lake, as it appears within The Spoilage account 
and the subsequent judicial response, is a similar—similarly constitutional—
event.  It marks one of the few occasions (perhaps the only occasion) in which 
American citizens claim and exercise (and are understood to possess and exer-
cise) a freedom to choose their government.  In renouncing American citizen-
ship, the Tule Lake internees dramatized the fundamental premises of that citi-
zenship.  In renouncing citizenship, they proclaimed themselves constitutionally 
quintessentially “American.” 
 
 157. Bruce Ackerman’s complex accounts of transformative and consolidating elections are (by now 
famous and famously controversial) efforts to describe instances in which officials and the voting public 
together engaged in “higher law” reformulations outside the bounds of constitutional texts as such.  See 
2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).  Larry Kramer proposes to rein-
vigorate the notion of “popular constitutionalism”—but ultimately as a means to motivate the Supreme 
Court to understand its work as part of a process of government within which the public is also a par-
ticipant.  See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 207-8, 249-53 (2004).  Public action is 
not, it seems, independent instantiation of constitutional norms. 
 158. For suggestive illustrations, see, e.g., STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK 
POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN THE RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION 107-09 
(2003); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 110-19 (1988). 
 159. See Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery 
Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989). 
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APPENDIX 
The Spoilage and Its Critics 
The preface introducing The Spoilage advertises its methodological precari-
ousness.  Five Berkeley faculty members initially organized the effort, but four 
soon left the project to assume wartime responsibilities, leaving Dorothy Tho-
mas in charge.160  The initial program for the study was not implemented, partly 
because of these exits, but “mainly because the course of events which were to 
be investigated could not be anticipated.”161  Some standard forms of investiga-
tion were not usable.  “[W]e realized that we could not utilize attitude surveys 
or questionnaires to get valid (or any) information from people whose recent 
experiences had led to an intense preoccupation with the real and imagined 
dangers of verbal commitments and to growing suspicions of the intentions of 
persons who asked them to commit themselves on even the most innocuous 
questions.”162  On-site reporting therefore served as the principal method of 
study: 
[W]e had to depend on a day-to-day record, as complete as possible, of the maneuvers 
and reactions of an insecure, increasingly resentful people to policies imposed by gov-
ernment agencies and to incidents developing from the application of these policies. 
 . . .  [T]he main part of the record of what was going on inside the camps could be ob-
tained only by “insiders,” that is, by trained observers who were themselves participat-
ing in and reacting to the events under observation.  Most of the staff observers were 
evacuees. . . .  All these observers had had university training in one or more of the so-
cial sciences, but only three of them had any prior experience in field investigation.    
In addition to the Japanese American staff observers, three “Caucasian” members of 
our staff resided for long periods in the camps we were studying.  Two of these were 
graduate students in anthropology; one was a sociologist, with graduate training in po-
litical science.163 
There were obvious risks raised by this sort of fieldwork:  “ad hoc selection,” 
“emotional identification” of observers with the persons under study, “linguistic 
and cultural distortion.”164  “[N]o techniques could be devised to assure com-
plete success in overcoming all these methodological difficulties.”165 
As published, The Spoilage presents itself as a straightforward expression of 
the research strategy that lay behind it—as a narrative of “maneuvers and reac-
tions” emphasizing “the experiences of that part of the minority group whose 
status in America was impaired:  those of the immigrant generation who re-
turned, after the war, to defeated Japan; those of the second generation who re-
 
 160. THE SPOILAGE, supra note 5, at vi n.1. 
 161. Id.  “Planning was on a point-by-point basis: old questions were discarded and new questions 
raised as the ramifications of a highly dynamic situation became apparent; ad hoc techniques had to be 
devised to meet the exigencies of data collection in an ever-changing, emotionally charged situation.”  
Id. 
 162. Id. at vii. 
 163. Id. at vii-viii. 
 164. Id. at x. 
 165. Id. 
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linquished American citizenship.”166  This recounting, it was thought, was “a 
unique record and analysis of the continuing process of interaction between 
government and governed, through the point-by-point reproduction of stages in 
the process of attitude formation.”167  Seemingly evoking the procedure organiz-
ing its writing, the book named two principal authors—Dorothy Thomas and 
Richard Nishimoto—and four contributors—Rosalie Hankey, James Sakoda, 
Morton Grodzins, and Frank Miyamoto. 
The Spoilage, though, proved to be a complex and controversial effort. 
Initial reviewers recorded doubts.  “As valuable as this volume is . . . ,” Kim-
ball Young wrote, “the authors failed to make use of their materials to combine 
sociological theory with empirical findings.  Nowhere is there a systematic pres-
entation of the processual changes which might have been given if only in 
schematic and summary form.”168  “There should have been an additional chap-
ter,” it seemed to Solon Kimball, “which would share with us the sociological 
insights which the authors undoubtedly gained.”169  There was also harsh, em-
phatic denunciation.  Anthropologist Marvin Opler charged that too much of 
The Spoilage revealed “incomplete coverage and sensationalistic opinion,” that 
the end result was “a factional interpretation” rooted in the “undue credence” 
given some “two dozen factional leaders who happened to impress” a single 
fieldworker.170  Opler invoked his own work:  “After three years at Tule Lake, 
with a staff of sixteen technical assistants, hundreds of contacts, and a tendency 
to sample opinion by block, area of the center, faction, personality variant, age 
and status group, I am greatly dubious of such oversimplifications.”171  He noted 
that neither of the principal authors of The Spoilage had “attempted any field 
work warranting the name” at Tule Lake.172  In particular, Opler thought, The 
Spoilage account of renunciation of citizenship at Tule Lake was utterly useless: 
[I]t fails to explain the cultural revivalism which flourished there and is implicit in the 
steps leading to citizenship renunciation. . . . The anthropologist interested in cultural 
revivalistic phenomena must look elsewhere, though this case is perhaps the most 
striking and controlled experiment in social psychology to be found anywhere.  As a 
result, Tule Lake is given too much the cast of a “disloyal” center where “disloyals” 
were treated badly. . . . [T]here is practically nothing on Center art and religion, rec-
reation, welfare and economic status.  Obviously, the 19,000 men, women and children 
 
 166. Id. at vii, xii. 
 167. Id. at xii. 
 168. Kimball Young, Book Review, 12 AMER. SOC. REV. 362, 363 (1947). 
 169. Solon T. Kimball, Book Review, 53 AMER. J. SOC. 228, 229 (1947). 
 170. Marvin K. Opler, Book Review, 50 AMER. ANTHROPOLOGIST 307, 308, 309 (1948).  Rosalie 
Hankey—the fieldworker to whom Opler refers—remains a controversial figure because she departed 
from JERS norms on at least two occasions, sharing information she had acquired from camp residents 
with FBI agents.  For measured discussion of Hankey’s conduct, see S. Frank Miyamoto, supra note 7, 
at 52-58. 
 171. Opler, supra note 170, at 308. 
 172. Id. 
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cramped in a square-mile of tar-papered “theater of operations” barracks do not 
emerge as people.173 
The Spoilage, it might be thought, was neither sociology nor anthropology.174 
In the years since its publication, a second line of criticism of The Spoilage 
has also emerged.  Its principal focus is Dorothy Thomas, the book’s senior au-
thor and director of the larger study.  Stephen Murray wrote in 1991: 
It is no exaggeration to say that Thomas was compulsively concerned with verification 
or that she had a strong aversion to speculative conclusions, and indeed to any linking 
of research results to existing social theory.  Her comments on staff reports through-
out the course of the project are a litany of “How do you know this?” and “Unwar-
ranted speculation!” challenges . . . . [I]t is probably true that no one, including herself, 
ever met Thomas’s standards of proof.175 
One result was that the participant observers whose reports supplied the start-
ing points for The Spoilage were seemingly left at sea.176  Murray suspects that 
 
 173. Id. at 310.  Professor Miyamoto responds to Professor Opler’s criticisms at some length.  See 
Miyamoto, supra note 7, at 46-52. 
 174. For purposes of assessing these criticisms, several contextual dimensions should perhaps be 
noted.  Marvin Opler and many other social scientists studying the camps worked for or with the War 
Relocation Authority, or with other government agencies, and published either with government sup-
port or with an eye to assisting government efforts.  See, e.g., EDWARD H. SPICER, ASAEL T. HANSEN, 
KATHERINE LUOMALA & MARVIN K. OPLER, IMPOUNDED PEOPLE (1969) (first published as a WRA 
report in 1946); ALEXANDER H. LEIGHTON, THE GOVERNING OF MEN: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON EXPERIENCE AT A JAPANESE RELOCATION CAMP (1945).  There 
was, it appears, some tension in the interaction of JERS and government-associated social scientists—in 
particular, concerning the usual refusal of Dorothy Thomas to share JERS working documents as such 
with camp officials.  See Ichioka, JERS Revisited, supra note 6, at 13-16.  The theoretical models with 
which the government social scientists worked incorporated distinctive presuppositions, even assuming 
otherwise disinterested study.  The emphasis fell, predominantly, on individual and social psychology, 
with priority going to individual psychology.  Alexander Leighton’s discussion is especially clear and 
elaborate in this regard:  principal concluding chapters consider (in order) “Individuals Under Stress,” 
“Systems of Belief Under Stress,” and “Social Organizations Under Stress.”  See LEIGHTON, supra, at 
252-354.  More anthropological investigations also treated individual psychological states—to be sure, 
responding to camp circumstances—as the fundamental unit.  Thus “cultural revivalism” at Tule Lake 
figured as “a type . . . which could be duplicated among any American Indian revivalism ghost-dance 
cult in the early stages of reservation life, . . . the refurbishing of the habitual stock in trade of a de-
feated or frustrated older generation.”  Renunciation was a product of “fears and motivations” of a 
piece with cultural revivalism—to be sure, deepened by administrative mistakes—understandable as 
“psychological and mass responses,” “hysterical or coerced,” but also simply one cycle, a “swing in sen-
timent” followed by a “second and final cycle,” an ultimate “recoil from relocation fears and escapism.”  
SPICER ET AL., supra, at 271, 272, 273, 275.  This emphasis is quite similar to the focus of district judge 
Mathes in Murakami.  See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. 
 175. Stephen O. Murray, The Rights of Research Assistants and the Rhetoric of Political Suppression: 
Morton Grodzins and the University of California Japanese-American Evacuation and Resettlement 
Study, 27 J. HIS. BEHAV. SCI. 130, 147 (1991).  Dorothy Thomas’s earlier work with William O. Douglas 
at the Yale Law School displayed a similarly skeptical rigor.  See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN 
LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 102-05 (1995). 
 176. “[T]he participant observers from the project still alive in the late 1980s remained perplexed by 
what they were supposed to have done, and frustrated at the lack of theoretical guidance.”  Murray, 
supra note 175, at 150 n.16.  “By standard criteria of sociological research, Thomas clearly failed to give 
adequate direction to her staff.” Miyamoto, supra note 7, at 40.  Professor Miyamoto believes that 
Dorothy Thomas’s aversion to structured theory reflected, at least in part, a distinctive approach to so-
ciology, emphasizing close study of particular situations (often associated with her husband W.I. Tho-
mas) urging “a pragmatic open-mindedness that precluded the use of any particular theory of human 
behavior.”  Id. at 37.  The axiom provoking this approach first appeared in a book that W.I. Thomas 
and Dorothy Thomas published in 1928:  “[I]f men define situations as real, they are real in their con-
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Thomas was proceeding without a compass, “collecting every kind of documen-
tation which could be found . . . .  [T]he paucity of published results, especially 
when contrasted to the vast amount of unused data, suggests that she did not 
know what to do with the data collected . . . .”177  Responsibility for the missing 
chapter that Young and Kimball noted,178 and the field work that Opler found to 
be so unsatisfactory, should (it appears) rest with Dorothy Thomas. 
Thomas extended her censorship of ungrounded speculation to include in-
dependent efforts proposed by Spoilage contributors Mortin Grodzins and 
James Sakoda.  Grodzins ultimately published his work—the well-known  
Americans Betrayed179—but only after an at times fierce dispute between the 
University of California and the University of Chicago framed by Thomas’s in-
sistence that the California study could, as a matter of right, regulate any publi-
cation by Grodzins (a research assistant and graduate student at the time) that 
was based on California data.180  Sakoda abandoned his project.181  Strikingly, 
Lane Ryo Hirabayashi argued in The Politics of Fieldwork that, with respect to 
Japanese Americans employed in the study, Dorothy Thomas’s exercise of au-
thority amounted to an exercise in colonialism: 
Much of the . . . data . . . were generated by “natives,” on site, for the ultimate use of a 
Euro-American scholar who was not, herself, physically present.  This person, Doro-
thy Thomas, paid minimal wages, expropriated the data, and took control of the final 
analysis as well as the production of formal studies (as products) and their publication.  
In the end, Thomas simply forced the raw data that . . . fieldworkers had gathered 
back into a conceptual framework with which she was familiar. . . . It is interesting to 
conjecture whether senior scholars’ practices along these lines engender a dramatic 
narrowing of perspectives, potentially very deleterious to social sciences that revolve 
around a deep commitment to a comparative understanding of societies, cultures, and 
worldviews.182 
It might seem that The Spoilage is a book better left unread. 
Or perhaps The Spoilage is a somewhat different book from the book that 
its critics suppose it to be or the book that they think it should be.  The distinc-
tion that Lane Hirabayashi draws between “the raw data that . . . fieldwork-
ers . . . gathered” and the “conceptual framework” into which the data were 
 
sequences.”  WILLIAM I. THOMAS & DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS, THE CHILD IN AMERICA 572 
(1928).  (Robert Merton declared this to be “probably the single most consequential sentence ever put 
in print by an American sociologist.”  ROBERT K. MERTON, Social Knowledge and Public Policy, in 
SOCIOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE 156, 174 (1976).)  For a discussion of W.I. Thomas and his thinking, see 
DONALD N. LEVINE, VISIONS OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION 260-68 (1995). 
 177. Murray, supra note 175, at 132.  For evidence supporting this conclusion, see James M. Sakoda, 
Reminiscences of a Participant Observer, in VIEWS FROM WITHIN, supra note 6, at 222-24. 
 178. See text accompanying notes 168-69. 
 179. MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION 
(1949). 
 180. This controversy—exhaustively explored—is the chief topic of Stephen Murray’s article.  See 
Murray, supra note 175. 
 181. See id. at 152 n.41.  For a later summary of the project, see James M. Sakoda, The “Residue”: 
The Unresettled Minidokans, 1943-1945, in VIEWS FROM WITHIN, supra note 6, at 247-84. 
 182. LANE RYO HIRABAYASHI, THE POLITICS OF FIELDWORK: RESEARCH IN AN AMERICAN 
CONCENTRATION CAMP 169 (1999) [hereinafter THE POLITICS OF FIELDWORK].  See also Miyamoto, 
supra note 7, at 41-43. 
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“simply forced” is usefully provocative.  There appears to be little doubt that 
“fieldworkers” were “forced” to use a set of simple demographic categories in 
writing their reports—prominently, terms distinguishing camp occupants who 
were born in Japan from occupants born and continuously resident in the 
United States and occupants born in the United States but educated in Japan.  
But there also seems to be agreement among most readers of The Spoilage that 
these terms did little theoretical work and conspicuously failed (if this were 
their purpose) to generate a “conceptual framework.”  A likely actual use for 
the required terminology becomes easier to discern after considering Dorothy 
Thomas’s description of the study’s processes, put forward in her 1952 presiden-
tial address to the American Sociological Society: 
Data on behavior and attitudes were collected both by evacuee members of our re-
search staff, and by other field works who, with official approval, lived in the quarters 
assigned to administrative personnel.  Among the evacuees who worked on the study, 
and whose participation in the situations they were observing was a matter over which 
they could exercise little control, were persons of diverse background and training, in-
cluding sociologists, an anthropologist, an engineer, an agricultural economist, a psy-
chologist, a social worker, and a journalist, while the nonevacuee field workers in-
cluded two anthropologists and a historian.  Each of them prepared many reports on 
special topics, which followed outlines developed in terms of our ever-changing “in-
terdisciplinary conceptualization,” but more important were the undirected journals 
kept by most of the participant observers and field workers.  These journals included 
running accounts of “current events,” information obtained from wide circles of “par-
ticipating informants” (both evacuees and administrative personnel), and accounts of 
the actions and conversations of many persons who did not know either that the study 
was being made or that they were under observation.  Each journal-keeper also re-
corded the course of his own experiences and his attitudes towards these experiences 
with the maximum possible frankness, and appended all documentary material that he 
could collect.  Each brought to his journal something of the standpoint of his own dis-
cipline and his own biases, in the very process of selecting events, words, and acts to 
record.  And as the anthropologist Tsuchiyama remarked, whatever his background, 
each observer and field worker soon found himself functioning more as a “foreign cor-
respondent” than as a social scientist, for good reporting was essential in a study 
where the “preconceptualized” lines of inquiry were often vague and inadequate.  
These day-to-day on-the-spot records were a principal and essential source for retro-
spective analyses.183 
In Thomas’s account, the observers and field workers were valued not so 
much as “social scientists”—(as such inadequate in numbers and preparation, 
Marvin Opler had concluded)—rather, they were appreciated as camp occu-
pants (albeit occupants of importantly different parts of the camps) who re-
ported their own experiences and reactions to the events occurring around 
them, and supplied whatever seemingly relevant documents came their way.184  
 
 183. Dorothy Swaine Thomas, Experiences in Interdisciplinary Research, 17 AMER. SOC. REV. 663, 
668 (1952). 
 184. It is clear that observers and field workers sometimes resisted this redefinition. (Not always, 
however:  for a clear example of an instance in which a JERS observer recognized his own status as a 
participant, see S. Frank Miyamoto, Reminiscences, in VIEWS FROM WITHIN, supra note 6, at 154-55.) 
Rosalie Hankey, a graduate student in anthropology and non-Japanese American observer who be-
came the principal Tule Lake reporter (and who would be acknowledged for her “contributions” on the 
title page of The Spoilage), included this revealing passage in an autobiographical account that she 
wrote shortly after concluding her field work: 
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If fieldworkers were understood first as “participants,” and only thereafter as 
“observers,” the structure of the California project looks quite different.  Field-
workers (borrowing Hirabayashi’s term) were indeed “natives”—whether they 
were Japanese American or not.  But they did not “gather[]” “raw data”— they 
were themselves “raw data,” or, more precisely, their “undirected journals” 
(Thomas’s revealing term) were.185  The fieldworkers “prepared many reports 
on special topics,” but their “day-to-day on-the-spot records,” their personal 
and informal reactions and accounts, were the “principal and essential” re-
sources.  The formal reports and their required vocabularies, it appears, were 
provocations—means of inserting fieldworkers into camp life (more, perhaps, 
than they would be otherwise inclined) and thus means (in the best behaviorist 
tradition) of provoking fieldworker responses.186 
But fieldworkers were not “participants” in camp life just like all other oc-
cupants.  Because they were identified as “observers,” they were more or less 
protected (although never entirely) from risks of especially hostile acts of either 
administrators or “ordinary” internees.187  More importantly, insofar as they 
were also “observers,” these “participants” could function as a kind of con-
trolled sample:  their accounts and reactions might be subjected to an intense 
scrutiny impossible to bring to bear with regard to other occupants and thus 
could be judged carefully as representations of the conduct and reactions of 
other occupants.  This is precisely what was done.  The Spoilage preface reports 
that there were 
frequent conferences of observers and other staff members with the director of the 
study and its advisers.  Because California was a “prohibited area,” to our Japanese 
American staff members, these conferences could never be held at the University of 
 
Just as I was finishing this report I received a letter curtly ordering me to abandon my time-
wasting interest in the Japanese language and in quaint Japanese customs and to report what 
was going on.  Under the circumstances, I could do little but laugh.  I wrote in reply that I 
would not defend my strange field techniques in detail but would allow the inclosed report to 
justify them.  Needless to say, my techniques were not criticized again. 
Rosalie Hankey Wax, Twelve Years Later: An Analysis of Field Experience, 63 AMER. J. SOC. 133, 139 
(1957). “[T]he anthropologist Tsuchiyama” whom Dorothy Thomas credited for the “‘foreign corre-
spondent’” characterization, is the chief subject of Lane Hirabayashi’s rich and powerful The Politics of 
Fieldwork, supra note 182.  Tamie Tsuchiyama, an obviously gifted Japanese American anthropology 
graduate student, ultimately proved unsuccessful, sadly, in her attempt to assert her status as an an-
thropologist as such within the context and demands of the University of California project.  Id.  She no 
doubt appreciated the irony of the recognition accorded her in Thomas’s presidential address, accom-
panied as it was by the immediately reductive recharacterization of Tsuchiyama’s own work in the 
camps (for which Tsuchiyama herself was cited!). 
 185. “[M]ost of the observers were genuine participants in the events they were recording.  Evacuee 
observers were, like other evacuees, involuntarily detained in camps and their fate was closely bound 
up with the course of events they were observing, while Caucasian observers tended to develop an emo-
tional identification with the group they were studying.  The observers’ subjective reactions, under 
these tense conditions, were considered important data in and of themselves . . . .”  THE SPOILAGE, su-
pra note 5, at x. 
 186. Insofar as the formal reports were based on outlines “developed in terms of . . . ever-changing 
“interdisciplinary conceptualization,” Thomas, supra note 183, at 668, individual reports might have 
possessed some social science value per se, but it is not easy to see how the reports in the aggregate 
would have been analyzable as academic work. 
 187. But see Miyamoto, Reminiscences, supra note 184. 
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California.  They were, therefore, arranged every few months in Denver, Phoenix, Salt 
Lake City, or Chicago, and extended over a period of a week or more, during which 
each observer and staff member presented his problems and findings for the detailed 
criticism and appraisal of his colleagues.  Interspersed between these general confer-
ences were visits of the director and advisors of the study to the several camp “labora-
tories” and of both evacuee and Caucasian observers from one camp to another, as 
well as constant interchange of field notes and reports.188 
This re-characterization of the processes from which The Spoilage emerged 
does not recast the University of California study as ethically or politically un-
controversial.  Participant observers, whether Japanese American or not, were 
obviously manipulated and subjected to stresses unique to their particular 
roles—they were treated as laboratory animals, even as they thought of them-
selves as laboratory workers.  But it is not easy to describe the study, cast in 
these terms, as straightforwardly “colonial.”  It is important to emphasize not 
only the overlapping situations of Japanese American and “Caucasian” partici-
pant observers, but also the in many respects shared setting in which participant 
observers and the larger population of camp occupants found themselves.  Fur-
thermore, the tendency to associate The Spoilage and the larger University of 
California study exclusively with Dorothy Thomas, perhaps especially prevalent 
in postwar decades, now increasingly appears to be a significant over-
simplification.  Thomas’s own astonishing career, her struggles and successes in 
the face of gender bias, both obvious and subtle, rightly marks her as an impor-
tant figure; so too, usual dynamics of reception in cases of collaborative work 
tend to highlight (sometimes unduly) senior participants.189  But Lane Hirabaya-
shi’s writing in particular calls attention to Richard S. Nishimoto, as does The 
Spoilage itself, naming Nishimoto along with Thomas as its author.  Acknowl-
edging Nishimoto’s role in the University of California study, it is easy to see, 
changes much. 
Richard Nishimoto is ubiquitous in the background in Hirabayashi’s account 
of Tamie Tsuchiyama’s experiences.190  Indeed, it easy to read The Politics of 
Fieldwork as not only a narrative of Tsuchiyama’s difficult dealings with Doro-
thy Thomas, but as also the story of Nishimoto’s whirlwind rise within the world 
of the California study.  He begins as a Stanford educated engineer and an or-
dinary internee at Poston, emerges as an unusually effective political organizer 
opposing camp administrators, becomes Tsuchiyama’s principal informant and 
collaborator, and ultimately becomes a staff member of the University of Cali-
fornia study, sent by Dorothy Thomas along with Tsuchiyama to evaluate the 
work of Rosalie Hankey at Gila, empowered to assist Hankey but also to fire 
her if necessary.191  Elsewhere, Hirabayashi publishes three reports that Nishi-
 
 188. THE SPOILAGE, supra note 5, at xi. 
 189. Concerning both Thomas’s career and collaborative dynamics, see Robert K. Merton, The 
Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect, 74 SOC. FORCES 379 (1995). 
 190. See HIRABAYASHI, supra note 182, at 112-17. 
 191. See HIRABAYASHI, supra note 182. 
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moto wrote at Poston,192 and (with James Hirabayashi) discusses Nishimoto’s 
“central role” in the writing of The Spoilage.193 
Hirabayashi and Hirabayashi carefully note: “Documentary evidence which 
would clarify Nishimoto’s substantive and conceptual contributions to the . . . 
JERS publications is extremely limited.”194  Nonetheless, the primary emphasis 
of The Spoilage in particular—its preoccupation with the history of political ac-
tion (chiefly at Tule Lake), its description of politics largely in terms of immedi-
ate tactics and goals—finds clear parallels in Nishimoto’s own political work,195 
and in reports of advice he gave other field workers (notably Rosalie 
Hankey).196  Nishimoto, it might be thought, would have served at minimum as a 
crucial interpreter and “double-check” with respect to the reports of Hankey 
and others.  Perhaps he therefore becomes a sort of superstar “native infor-
mant.”  Or perhaps his role really was much more—“co-author,” as The Spoil-
age itself asserts—proof (once again) that the whole idea of “the native infor-
mant” is artificial, an imposed “reader’s perspective,” and therefore contestable 
and revisable.197  If in fact a large part of the responsibility for The Spoilage 
should be attributed to Richard Nishimoto, it becomes easier to accept and 
judge the book on its own terms—as an account of a distinctive political se-
quence.  Much of the methodological debate becomes more or less beside the 
point.  The Spoilage, it would seem, is neither sociology nor anthropology.  The 
reports from which it draws, thus, are inappropriately judged from the perspec-
tives of those disciplines.  The pertinent question becomes:  What, precisely, is 
of lasting interest in the politics that Thomas and Nishimoto describe? 
The Spoilage, Yuji Ichioka observed, depicts “a historical vacuum.”  Its 
analysis appears to “rule out” any “historical linkage between the pre-war past 
and the wartime present, and therefore narrowly restrict[s] explanations of be-
havior to the wartime present.”198  Brian Hayashi reverses emphasis in his re-
cent, likely controversial, Democratizing the Enemy.199  Drawing on a wide range 
of archives, he reconstructs in considerable detail politics within principal Cali-
fornia Japanese American communities in the half-century or so before World 
War II.  This politics, he argues, explains much of what would later occur in the 
 
 192. See RICHARD S. NISHIMOTO, INSIDE AN AMERICAN CONCENTRATION CAMP (Lane Ryo Hir-
abayashi ed., 1995).  Hirabayashi also reprints an autobiographical letter that Nishimoto wrote in 1942.  
See id. at 9-33. 
 193. Lane Ryo Hirabayashi & James Hirabayashi, The “Credible” Witness: The Central Role of 
Richard S. Nishimoto in JERS, in VIEWS FROM WITHIN, supra note 6, at 65-94. 
 194. Id. at 77. 
 195. E.g., RICHARD S. NISHIMOTO, All Center Conference and Director Myer’s Visit, in INSIDE AN 
AMERICAN CONCENTRATION CAMP, supra note 192, at 171-233. 
 196. See Hirabayashi, supra note 193, at 87. 
 197. GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON: TOWARD A 
HISTORY OF THE VANISHING PRESENT 66, 67 (1999). 
 198. Yuji Ichioka, JERS Revisited: Introduction, in VIEWS FROM WITHIN, supra note 6, at 21, 22. 
 199. BRIAN MASARU HAYASHI, DEMOCRATIZING THE ENEMY: THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT (2004). 
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camps.  It was complexly fractured, but its divisions also disclosed an ongoing 
contest between Japanese and American identities.200 
Hayashi calls attention as well to the interplay of the Japanese and Ameri-
can governments, both before and during the war.  Japanese efforts to involve 
persons of Japanese origin in projects—including espionage—in the Philippines 
were well known within American military circles.  Japanese officials wished to 
proceed similarly in the United States.  The views of General DeWitt and his 
associates—linking race, culture, and political loyalty—mirrored Japanese gov-
ernment views (as well as the assumptions of many “California Japanese”).  
DeWitt’s military worries—and the worries of other American officials—were 
real and complex, even if espionage fears were misplaced.201  In any event, the 
internment orders responded not just to DeWitt (and local racist agitation),202 
but also to American government needs to appear to act in parallel with other 
North and South American governments dealing with Japanese-origin resi-
dents,203 and to the perceived demand for “hostages” to temper surprisingly 
harsh Japanese treatment of American nationals.204 
In the camps, it appears, successive periods of political clash and quietude 
revealed not only the effects of the residents’ divided attitudes, but also the con-
flicts between “liberal” administrators and residents who regarded race and 
loyalty as independent variables, and their disagreeing counterparts who linked 
the two notions.  At least as importantly, camp politics reflected—throughout 
the period—resident perceptions of the progress of the war, and predictions of 
likely post-war circumstances in the event of Japanese victory or a negotiated 
peace.  Camp residents were transnational actors, carefully gauging the costs 
and benefits of “Japanese” and “American” identities in light of available in-
formation. 205 
The evident importance of The Spoilage shrinks substantially within the 
terms laid out in Democratizing the Enemy.206  Professor Hayashi recasts camp 
 
 200.  
[M]any California Japanese . . . followed popular trends in Japan toward fusing “race” with 
“culture” and “political loyalty” as they built their intra-ethnic political organizations . . . .  
[T]heir community politics was often contentious and their image of ethnic solidarity or fac-
tional disputes along generational lines was more apparent than real.  They were also divided 
by class, immigration status, occupation, prefectural origins [in Japan], regionalism, and gen-
der, fissures readily apparent in their struggle with one another for political control over the 
right to speak for and determine the direction of the California Japanese community.  The ra-
cial formation process they experienced, combined with their varying political practices and 
intra-ethnic divisions, set the stage for conflict once they were incarcerated in wartime concen-
tration camps. 
Id. at 40. 
 201. “However misguided, Roosevelt’s fears were not without merit.”  Id. at 39. 
 202. Professor Hayashi suggests that DeWitt’s racism was also more nuanced than usual depictions 
suppose.  See, e.g., id. at 79, 90-91. 
 203. See id. at 82. 
 204. See, e.g., id. at 81, 83-84. 
 205. See id. at 106-79. 
 206. See id. at 3. 
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politics as mostly epiphenomenal.  “California Japanese” are conscious of their 
possible alternate identities, sensitive to politics and prospects in Japan, and es-
pecially attentive to the possible consequences of war.  American officials pur-
sue multiple agendas and their own global preoccupations.  Hayashi studies the 
camps in order to glimpse the world outside—not just at that moment, but also 
as it stood and would stand previously and subsequently.207  At times, his book 
exhibits an almost Olympian detachment.208 
There is, however, this qualification: 
[I]t is also important to explain what the findings do not indicate.  They do not justify 
internment of Japanese Americans despite the obvious presence of Japanese national-
istic sentiments before and during the camps, since people cannot and should not be 
locked up on the basis of political sentiment . . . .  Nor does the presence of a small 
number of individuals willing to pass on information of military value to the Japanese 
government justify mass removal or internment. . . . The findings here also do not sup-
port the argument that the victims suffered little during World War II.  Camp life had 
many oppressive aspects to it—the roll calls, the contraband searches, the spies, the 
poor living accommodations—and was without a doubt racially discriminatory . . . .  
And finally, . . . the study does not find that the United States government treated en-
emy aliens relatively well because of a “liberal” tradition.  Rather, the American con-
centration camps did not become oppressive because of the need to ensure humane 
treatment of over twenty-one thousand American servicemen and fourteen thousand 
civilians in Japanese hands by 1942.209 
Passing judgment, Professor Hayashi treats the norms that he invokes as self-
evident truths.  They are just as readily characterized, though, as familiar 
propositions within American constitutional law—part of the mechanics, say, of 
free speech protection, due process of law, and the equal protection of the laws.  
Hayashi’s declaration in this regard also bears a marked family resemblance to 
a comment of the Japanese-nationalist gang leader (and renounced American 
citizen) “Kira” prominent in the final phases of Tule Lake politics reported in 
The Spoilage: 
 
 207. In this regard, he addresses the question of why it was that the global perspective he maps did 
not figure much in post-war accounts of internment—identifying “a particular spin . . . appropriat[ing] 
the analogy of the Holocaust” that “narrowed the cause of removal and internment to ‘race’” akin to 
anti-Semitism, in the process prompting “rapid dismissal of security issues . . . as a mere fig leaf for ra-
cism,” and “narrowing Japanese American responses to their victimization largely in terms of accom-
modation or resistance.” Id. at 217; see id. at 2-4. 
 208.  
In contrast to the actions of politicians in other countries, President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
treatment of Japanese Americans seems relatively benign. . . . British officials . . . arrested 
twenty-six thousand Austrians, Germans, and Italians, many without trial, and allowed their 
guards to separate some families, steal their property, and were partly responsible for the 
death of hundreds who drowned at sea in route to Canada.  National leaders of . . . Common-
wealth countries . . . expanded their definition of “enemy aliens” to arrest and detain those 
with long-term residency or British citizenship, separated interned families, and even con-
scripted enemy alien labor.  Other Allied leaders simply confiscated their property and ex-
pelled them from the country. . . .  “Captivity is as old as war itself,” Jonathan Vance reminds 
us, and it also involves civilians who, though not prisoners of war in a strict sense, are never-
theless “prisoners in wartime.” 
Id. at 6-7. 
 209. Id. at 11 (emphasis in original). 
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The Denationalization Bill is a wartime law, and I think it’s unconstitutional, because 
you can’t discriminate against a certain portion of the people just because of their 
color and race.  They evacuated us, and they try to pin us down to a citizen’s duties.  
Once a person is thrown into camp and pushed around, he looks at things emotionally.  
We cannot be held responsible for what we do in camp.  After the war the entire pic-
ture will be changed.  The United States will not deport those who renounced their 
citizenship.210 
 These juxtapositions—and the easy overlap of “technical” and “moral” reg-
isters that they show—point to an important conclusion:  American constitu-
tional law is an insular domestic language of apologetics and critique and also, 
somehow simultaneously, an apt instrument for framing suitable global stand-
points.  It is, in other words, a microcosm or model, an accessible context for ar-
ticulating and testing commitments.  It is akin to (and may sometimes itself put 
to work) the Hobbesian state of nature, for example, or the Rawlsian original 
position, the prisoner’s dilemma game, or indeed the internee’s lot at Tule Lake 
that its readers glimpse in such considerable detail in The Spoilage.  The Spoil-
age too, therefore, can be understood to display large as well as small dimen-
sions. 
 
 210. THE SPOILAGE, supra note 5, at 326.  For discussion of “Kira,” his background, and Rosalie 
Hankey’s controversial dealings with him, see S. Frank Miyamoto, supra note 7, at 54-58. 
